Synopsis

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN
THE LAW OF THE SEA 1979-1980

This Synopsis highlights major events occurring between December 1979 and December 1980 that affect the law of the sea. It
discusses the Ninth Session of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS M) and significant events
outside UNCLOS MI. The primary sources used to complete this
synopsis include: United Nations documents, United Nations
press releases, the United Nations Chronicle,InternationalLegal
Materials, the United States Department of State Bulletin, Department of State internal documents, United States Code, Congressional and Administrative News, the Congressional
Quarterly, Worldwide Reports, Law of the Sea, the New York
Times, the Wall Street Journal,the Washington Post, the Los Angeles Times, and the London Times.
THE NINTH SESSION OF THE THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE
ON THE LAW OF THE SEA

Introduction
The Ninth Session of UNCLOS M offered new hope that the
protracted negotiations' would in fact lead to the successful conclusion of an international Convention on the Law of the Sea in
1. The Third Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) opened in
1974. Since then, sessions have been held annually. UNCLOS is the longest and
largest plenipotentiary conference ever convened. At the last meeting of the Ninth
Session in Geneva, 160 States participated in negotiations.
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1981.2 The basic structure of the Ninth Session followed that of
previous sessions, 3 with meetings in New York and Geneva. The
negotiators at the New York meeting made considerable progress
toward the formulation of a draft convention, resolving many of
the outstanding issues of the Eighth Session.4 Nevertheless, extended debate and continued failure to reach agreement on a voting mechanism in the Sea-Bed Council5 prevented the
Conference from meeting the ambitious timetable 6 it had established the previous summer. Even so, many negotiated compromises received consensus approval and the meeting produced
a second revision to the Informal Composite Negotiating Text
(ICNT/R2) .7

At the resumed Ninth Session in Geneva the negotiators were
2. United States Ambassador to the Law of the Sea Conference, Elliot L
Richardson, said it was "all but certain" that the text would be ready for signing in
1981. N.Y. Times, Aug. 30, 1980, § A, at 4, col. 1.
3. It consisted of three main committees. Committee I dealt with management and control of deep seabed resources in areas beyond national jurisdiction.
Committee II discussed jurisdictional issues within the territorial sea, the 200-mile
exclusive economic zone, the continental shelf, and the high seas. Committee I
developed regimes regulating marine pollution and scientific research.
During the New York meeting, Committees I and I1 were further divided into
seven established negotiating groups on particular igsues. The Working Group of
21 and several expert groups conducted additional negotiations. On several occasions, the Conference met in Informal Plenary. See Second Revised Informal
Composite Negotiating Text, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/WP. 10/Rev. 2, at 18-22 (Apr.
11, 1980) [hereinafter cited as ICNT/R2].
4. Meetings of the Eighth Session in 1979 resulted in sufficient progress to
produce a first revision to the Informal Composite Negotiating Text. Revised Informal Composite Negotiating Text, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/WP. 10/Rev. 1 (April 28,
1979) [hereinafter cited as ICNT/Rl]. For detailed coverage of the Eighth Session,
see Synopsis, Recent Developments in the Law of the Sea 1979, 17 SAN DIEGo L.
Rav. 691 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Recent Developments 1979]. For additional
background, see Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea: The Eighth Session, 74 Am. J. INr'L L. 1 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Oxman].
5. The Council is the executive organ of the International Sea-Bed Authority.
The Authority is the body which would supervise the conduct of deep seabed mining.
6. Report of the General Committee as Submitted to and Approved by the
Conference at 1st 118th Meeting, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/BUR/12 (Aug. 20, 1979).
The revised time table deferred the plenary debate on specific articles of the draft
Treaty until the Geneva Meeting. See U.N. Dep't of Pub. Information, Press Release SEA/396, at 6 (Apr. 4, 1980) [hereinafter cited as SEA/396].
7. The Informal Composite Negotiating Text and its several revisions constitute the basic negotiating documents for the draft Treaty. The procedure to be followed in revising the negotiating texts was established at the Seventh Session in
1978:
[A]ny modification or revision ... should emerge from the negotiations
themselves and should not be introduced on the initiative of any single
person, whether it be the President or a Chairman of a Committee, unless
presented to the plenary and found, from the widespread and substantial
support prevailing in plenary, to offer a substantially improved prospect of
a consensus,
U.N. Doc. A/ConL 62/62, para. 10 (Apr. 30, 1978).
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largely successful in reaching agreement on the remaining major
substantive issues, including resolution of the voting issue. This
permitted general debate in plenary and the transformation of the
ICNT/R2 into a Draft Convention. The Conference also considered procedures for formalizing the draft document into the finalized Convention. United States Ambassador to the Law of the
Sea Conference, Elliot L. Richardson, characterized the session
"as the most significant single development of the rule of law
since the founding of the United Nations itself."8 The Ninth Session adjourned with the expectation of completing all formal work
on the Convention at a New York meeting scheduled for March
1981.
The New York Meeting, March 3 - April 4, 1980
Committee I
The most significant negotiations and changes to the text took
place in Committee I. The deadlock over terms for transferring
seabed mining technology to the Enterprise 9 was partially broken.
Compromise on this issue, reflected in the revised negotiating
text,' 0 resulted from extensive negotiation in the Working Group
of 2111 and Negotiating Group One.' 2 Significant concessions

were made by both the industrialized nations and the Group of
77.13 All sides recognized the importance of providing the Enterprise with access to seabed technologies in order for a viable parallel mining system14 to develop. The industrialized nations,
however, wanted to clarify and limit such obligations.
8. N.Y. Times, Aug. 30, 1980, § A, at 4, col 1.
9. The Enterprise is the organ of the International Sea-Bed Authority that
would conduct deep seabed mining.
10. ICNT/R2, supra note 3, Annex I, art. 5. Compare id. with ICNT/R1,
supra note 4, Annex II, art. 5.
11. The Working Group of 21 was formed at the request of developing nations
to consider Committee I issues in a smaller forum.
12. Negotiating Group One dealt with the system of exploration and exploitation of the deep seabed and with resource development policy.
13. The Group of 77 is a bloc of approximately 110 developing countries. Their
concerns within UNCLOS mI have usually conflicted with those of the highly industrialized countries. For a discussion of the Group's role in UNCLOS MI, see
Friedman & Williams, The Group of 77 at the United Nations: An Emergent Force
in the Law of the Sea, 16 SAN DIEGO L REV. 555 (1979).
14. The term "parallel mining system" refers to the proposed system of mining in the International Sea-Bed Area that would allow for simultaneous participation of private contractors, States Parties, and the Enterprise.

A particularly controversial provision, the "Brazil clause,"' 5 had
required prospective miners to provide developing countries with
the same technology provided to the Enterprise. The clause was
modified to limit transfer obligations to developing countries to
those circumstances where the Enterprise chose not to assert its
own right of access.16 Nevertheless, the United States continued
7
to object to the new version of the clause.
Negotiated consensus on the timing, nature, and limits of technology transfer obligations resulted in other changes in the text.
Among these was the imposition of a time limit upon the duty to
transfer technology. Mining contractors would be subject to this
duty only until commencement of commercial operations by the
Enterprise; thereafter, the transfer obligation would be applicable
to such contracts for no more than ten years.' 8 Other changes
that received United States approval included the elimination of a
blacklisting provision,19 the strengthening of protections for proprietary information,20 and the simplification of dispute settlement procedures. 21 Overall, these revisions improved the
Enterprise's access to the tools needed to exploit seabed resources.
At the same time, greater recognition was given to the limited
ability of states with access to seabed technologies to bind themselves and their citizens to assure the availability of this technol15. ICNT/R2, supra note 3, Annex II, art. 5, para. 3(e). For a discussion of
Brazil's role in UNCLOS I, see Morris, Brazil at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 7 OCEAN D.v.IN'L L. 131 (1979).
16. ICNT/R2, supra note 3, Annex II, art. 5, para. 3(e). Compare id. with
ICNT/Rl, supra note 4, Annex II, art. 5, para. 1(e).
17. U.S. Delegation Report, Ninth Session of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, New York, February 27 - April 4, 1980, at 14 (unpublished paper) [hereinafter cited as U.S. Delegation Report, New York, 1980].
18. ICNT/R2, supra note 3, Annex III, art. 5, para. 7. Ambassador Richardson
reminded industry critics of the technology transfer provisions that "the intended
transfer is a sale of the technology in question on fair and reasonable commercial
terms and conditions." (emphasis in original). Richardson, In Pursuitof a Law of
the Sea, Washington Post, Mar. 24, 1980, § A, at 22, col 4.
19. ICNT/R1, supra note 4, Annex II, art. 5, para 1(b). Compare id. with
ICNT/R2, supra note 3, Annex II, art. 5, para. 1(b). The blacklisting provision, intended as a sanction against third party owners of technology who refused to
make their technology available to the Enterprise, was deleted in favor of a more
general obligation of States Parties having access to such technologies to act concertedly to ensure availability. ICNT/R2, supra note 3, Annex I, art 5, para. 5.
The possibility of reintroducing more direct sanctions was left open for further
consideration.
20. ICNT/R2, supra note 3, Annex Il, art. 5, para. 1.
21. Id. Annex HII, art. 5, para. 3(b). Compare id. with ICNT/R1, supra note 4,
Annex 11, art. 5, para. 2. The new text omitted a provision that would have allowed
disputants to resort in the first instance to protracted, non-binding conciliation
procedures.
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ogy.2 2 Similar recognition was given to the limitations on states'
abilities to police their contracting nationals engaged in mining
operations. The revised text made sponsoring states responsible
only to the extent feasible under their respective legal systems,
assuming that those states first discharged their responsibilities
by enacting appropriate implementing legislation. 23 The United
States expressed concern, however, over new language placing responsibility for the actions of multinational corporations on those
24
sponsoring states which "effectively control" such applicants.
Negotiating Group One was largely successful in reconciling
disagreement over quotas and anti-monopoly provisions governing the Authority's approval of mining applicants. Two stringent criteria for assessing whether approval of a mining contract
would lead to monopolization were adopted.25 A further guarantee was added to prohibit a transfer of rights from one contractor
to another in circumstances that would create a monopoly. 26 Negotiations concerning the applicant screening process also re27
sulted in revised criteria for assigning priority consideration,
and in giving preference to the Authority to exploit reserved ar28

eas.
The Group resolved the uncertainty regarding the status of
joint ventures entered into by the Enterprise. Under the new
text, joint arrangements between the Enterprise and other contractors would have the same protections against termination,
22. U.S. Delegation Report, New York, 1980, supra note 17, at 10.
23. ICNT/R2, supra note 3, Annex III, art. 4. Compare id. with ICNT/R1,
supra note 4, Annex I, art. 4.
24. ICNT/R2, supra note 3, Annex HI, art. 4, para. 2. See U.S. Delegation Report, Eighth Session at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea, New York, July 16 - August 24, 1979, at 11 (unpublished paper) [hereinafter
cited as U.S. Delegation Report, New York, 1979].
25. The first would limit a country's seabed operations to two percent-reduced from three percent--of the total seabed area open to exploitation by states
and private parties. The second, aimed at preventing a monopolization of sites in
a given area, would limit a country's approved and current holdings to 30% of a
circular area of 400,000 km 2 . ICNT/R2, supra note 3, art. 6, para. 3(d). France had
earlier unsuccessfully sponsored several amendments to strengthen the anti-monopoly provisions. U.S. Delegation Report, New York 1979, supra note 24, at 13.
26. ICNT/R2, supra note 3, Annex I, art. 20.
27. Priority consideration would be given to applicants who had already invested the most effort and resources in prospecting or exploration, id. Annex I,
art. 7, para. 2(c), and to applicants who had previously applied, but had not yet
received approval. Id. Annex MI, art. 7, para. 3.
28. The qualified-preference would apply "Whenever fewer reserved sites than
non-reserved sites are under exploitation." Id. Annex I, art. 7, para. 5.

suspension, or revision as would ordinary contracts with the Authority.2 9 The revised text did not, however, allay the previously

expressed concerns of the United States that the joint arrangements of the Enterprise would not subject that body to a program
of payments to the Authority.30
Debate over the array of sanctions to be levied against contracting parties resulted in additional changes. Negotiating Group
One provided for increased flexibility in these sanctions by allowing monetary penalties 31 as an alternative to suspension or
termination of mining contracts with the Authority. This lesser
sanction would be available even in cases of serious and persistent violations of contract terms or regulations.
The revised text also resolved one of the most intractible issues
of the Conference: the approach to future review of the seabed
mining system. 32 The contested provisions, which would have enabled the Assemby at a future Review Conference 33 to impose a
moratorium on seabed mining after 25 years, were deleted in
favor of provisions enabling the Review Conference to submit and
ratify amendments to the system of exploration and exploitation.34 At the same time, the Assembly would be precluded from
changing certain fundamentals of the system. Overall, these revisions provided for meaningful review while eliminating the more
drastic measure of a moratorium.
Negotiating Group One tightened the language pertaining to
control of activities in the International Sea-Bed Area. The negotiators sought this specificity in order to limit discretion of the
regulatory bodies. 35 For example, the revised provision governing
activities in the Area required policies be carried out "as specifi29. Id. Annex III, art. 11, para. 1. Compare id. with ICNT/Rl, supra note 4,

Annex II, art. 10, para. 2.
30. U.S. Delegation Report, New York, 1979, supra note 24, at 16.
31. ICNT/R2, supra note 3, Annex II, art 18, para. 2. Compare id. with ICNT/
RI, supra note 4, Annex II, art 17, para. 2.
32. SEA/396, supra note 6, at 9.
33. ICNT/R1, supra note 4, art. 155, para. 6.
34. ICNT/R2, supra note 3, art. 155, para. 5. The Review Conference would be
scheduled 15 years after the beginning of commercial production, rather than 20
years as previously agreed. Id. art. 155, para. 1. Amendments would require a twothirds majority vote in the Assembly. Id. para. 5.
35. The U.S. Delegation noted there was an increased need to rationalize and
consolidate procedures for the promulgation of rules and regulations by the governing bodies. U.S. Delegation Report, New York, 1980, supra note 17, at 9. Professor Oxman of the U.S. Delegation observed that[m]ajor consumers and seabed producers can hope to have no greater assured voting power in the Authority than the reasonable prospect of
preventing adverse decisions. They will be unable to impose positive decisions. The solution to the risk of inaction or deadlock is to establish the
precise conditions for mining in advance ....
Oxman, supra note 4, at 12.
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36

cally provided."
The United States delegation was instrumental in the movement to reinforce the environmental protection functions of the
Legal and Technical Commission.37 The revised text gave the
Commission the duty to recommend and coordinate monitoring
and inspection programs for activities within the Authority's jurisdiction.3 8 The Commission also would make recommendations
to the Council regarding proceedings before the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber, and the issuance of emergency orders or disapproval of areas for exploitation to prevent harm to the marine
environment.3 9 The Conference did not approve an earlier United
States proposal that would have given the Legal and Technical
40
Commission a more direct decision-making role.
A provision declaring financial returns from the mining of seabed resources to be for the "benefit of mankind as a whole,"
rather than for the sole benefit of the States Parties to the Convention, continued to cause difficulty. The provision expressly
recognized the needs and interests of peoples "who have not attained full independence or other self-governing status."41 Despite disagreement over this language, the matter was not given
much attention at the New York meeting.42

36. ICNT/R2, supra note 3, art. 150. Compare id. with ICNT/R1, supra note 4,
art. 150.
37. In meetings of the Working Group of 21, the U.S. Delegation reintroduced
the amendments to article 165 it had proposed at the Eighth Session. All but a
proposed change in title for the Commission were included in the ICNT/R2. U.S.
Delegation Report, New York, 1980, supra note 17, at 28.
38. ICNT/R2, supra note 3, art 165. For a discussion of national and regional
efforts to create legal regimes to protect the marine environment see notes 296-312
and accompanying text infra. For a discussion of UNCLOS pollution control enforcement mechanisms, see Bernhardt, A Schematic Analysis of Vessel-Source Pollution: Prescriptiveand Enforcement Regimes in the Law of the Sea Conference,
29 VA. J. INT'L L. 265 (1980). For a discussion of the problem of pollution enforcement in the exclusive economic zone, see Freidman & Bowen, Neglected Issues at
the Third United Nations Law of the Sea Conference, 5 OCEAN MANAGEMENT 309
(1979).
39. ICNT/R2, supra note 3, art 165. Compare id. with ICNT/R1, supra note 4,
art 165.
40. U.S. Delegation Report, New York, 1979, supra note 24, at 31.
41. ICNT/R2, supra note 3, art 140. Compare id. with ICNT/R1, supra note 4,
art. 140. For a Third World perspective on the role of the non-independent states
at UNCLOS see Agrait, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
and Non-Indpendent States, 7 OCEAN DEV. INT'L 1. 19 (1979).
42. After further debate at the resumed session in Geneva, the United States
was still referring to it as a "potentially destructive issue." N.Y. Times, Aug. 30,
1980, § A, at 4, col. 1.

Negotiating Group Two reported general agreement on a broad
range of revisions to the financial arrangements for seabed development. Revisions in the financial scheme for the Enterprise
were incorporated into an extensively reworked Statute of the
Enterprise. 4 3 Changes to the Statute reflect the emerging consensus that the Enterprise should operate on "sound commercial
principles" and with considerable autonomy from other governing
organs such as the Authority, the Council, and the Assembly.44
Specific powers and functions of the Governing Board of the En45
terprise were consolidated into a cohesive set of provisions.
Despite divergent positions of various delegations, Negotiating
Group Two also reached tentative agreement on Enterprise liability for financial payments to the Authority, and on the related
topic of national taxation.48 The amended Statute made it clear
that the Enterprise would make payments to the Authority from
its mining proceeds just as other seabed miners would be obliged
to do. Such payments would, however, be waived for an initial period, not exceeding 10 years, to permit the Enterprise to become
self-supporting. 47 The new text also deleted the Enterprise's controversial immunity from national taxation, leaving the issue for
negotiation between the Enterprise and the host countries.4 8
A key aspect in ensuring the viability of the parallel mining system was the guarantee of financing of an initial mine-site and of
certain attendant costs of exploration, exploitation, processing,
and marketing. After considerable debate, the Group left unchanged the formula for financing this initial project. 49 The
Group did, however, reach new compromises on an early determination of the total amount of loans requiredO and on ceilings for
43. ICNT/R2, supra note 3, Annex IV. Compare id. with ICNT/R1, supra note
4, Annex I. The U.S. Delegation analogized the Statute "to the charter and bylaws of a private corporation." U.S. Delegation Report, New York, 1980, supra note
17, at 24.
44. This emerging consensus was less than wholehearted. Some countries
called for supervision by the Council, whereas others preferred direct control by
the Assembly. U.S. Delegation Report, New York, 1980, supra note 17, at 24.
45. ICNT/R2, supra note 3, Annex IV, art. 6.
46. The Group of 77 argued for exemption from payments and national taxes,
while many developed countries pushed for a status similar to any other mining
contractor. SEA/396, supra note 6, at 19.
47. ICNT/R2, supra note 3, Annex III, art. 13, Annex V, art. 10.
48. Id. Annex IV, art. 13, para. 5.
49. Id. Annex IV, art. 11, para. 3. Financing would be provided through loans
from States Parties in accordance with their U.N. scale of contributions. One-half
of the total loan amount would be interest free. Id.
50. Incorporating a U.S. proposal, the revision would require the Preparatory
Commission to determine the amount prior to the ratification process in order to
give adequate notice to potential signatories to the Convention. ICNT/R2, supra
note 3, Annex IV, art. 11, para. 3(a).
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contributions by individual states. 51 The delegates also overcame
an earlier impasse on the form of payments. The new provision
required financial contributions be made to the Enterprise only in
convertible or freely usable currencies. 52 Despite these successes, the controversy over a loan repayment schedule remained
unresolved.5 3 The "mixed system" for financial payments to the
Authority from seabed mining contractors remained essentially
unchanged from the previous text.5 4
Although disharmony among the delegates prevented substantial change, 5 the text did represent the best possible compromise. The United States obtained acceptance of several minor
proposals, 5 6 but encountered resistence to its position that a
twenty-five percent floor on attributable net proceeds created "a
57
serious distortion in the calculation of return on investment.'
The Expert Group on Production Limitations attempted to
achieve consensus on production controls that would protect the
market of land-based nickel producers while giving adequate
stimulus to a nascent seabed mining industry. The basic scheme
51. If,
as is considered likely, less than all the U.N. Members ratify the Convention, there would be a need for additional loan contributions from certain countries exceeding their share as determined by the U.N. assessment scale. A
compromise, not entirely acceptable to the United States, would limit additional
assessments to 25% of the cost of one fully integrated mining project. ICNT/R2,
supra note 3, Annex IV, art. 11, para. 3(c). The United States had declared an intention to limit its own contribution to a 25% "cap" equivalent to the amount it
would normally contribute in accordance with the U.N. scale. The Soviet Union
took a similar position. U.S. Delegation Report, New York, 1980, supra note 17, at
23.
52. ICNT/R2, supra note 3, Annex IV, art 11, para. 3(g).
53. While the Group of 77 was reluctant to burden a nascent Enterprise with
debt service, the industrialized countries maintained that a repayment schedule,
published in advance of the ratification process, was indispensable. U.S. Delegation Report, New York, 1980, supra note 17, at 22.
54. ICNT/R2, .supra note 3, Annex III, art. 13. Compare id. with ICNT/R1,
supra note 4, Annex H, art. 12. The "mixed system" combines profit sharing with
royalty payments. See Recent Developments 1979, supra note 4; note 24 and accompanying text supra.
55. SEA/396, supra note 6, at 20-21.
56. ICNT/R2, Annex HI, art. 13, para. 4(k) was modified to permit contractors
to carry losses backward as well as forward. ICNT/R2, Annex II, art. 13, para. 3
was modified to permit waiver of a fixed fee where commencement of commercial
production would be postponed because of a production quota.
57. U.S. Delegation Report, New York, 1980, supra note 17, at 20. "Attributable
net proceeds" is defined as "the product of the contractor's net proceeds and the
ratio of the development costs in the mining sector to the contractor's development costs." ICNT/R2, supra note 3, Annex III, art. 13, pam. 4(3).

remained largely unaltered,5 8 but the group did establish new
minimum5 9 and maximum 60 growth allowances for seabed mining

production. Seabed production was further limited by a maxi61
mum tonnage allowance for any single mine-site.
Despite its inclusion in the ICNT/R2, the system of production
limitations was still unacceptable to a number of land-based producing countries. 62 Also retained in the new text despite contin-

ued objections by some industrialized countries 63 was a provision
for unrestricted participation by the Authority in commodity
64

agreements.
Preparatory investment protection, an issue closely related to
seabed production policies, was considered at the New York
meeting. The United States submitted an informal working paper6 5 which outlined a proposed mechanism to accommodate continued seabed mining development and investment during the
period between signature and entry into force of the Treaty.66 No
58. Id. art. 151. Compare id. with ICNT/R1, supra note 4, art. 151. The broad
outline of this scheme would prohibit seabed production of nickel exceeding 60%
of the annual increase in total world production. For a discussion of various proposals aimed at protecting the land-based nickel producing market while stimulating the growth of the seabed mining industry, see Herman, The Niceties ofNickelCanada and the ProductionCeiling Issue at the Law of the Sea Conference, 6 SYRACUSE J. IL&'L L. CoM. 265 (1979).
59. This compromise formula would provide seabed mining interests with a
guaranteed three percent increase even in slow growth years when the actual increase in consumption might be less. ICNT/R2, supra note 3, art. 151, para.
2(b) (iii).
60. The group found it necessary to balance the benefit of this minimum
growth allocation to seabed mining with a "cap" that would protect land-based
producers. Thus, the 3% floor would be limited in all events to 100% of the actual
consumption increase. Id. Australia had argued for elimination of production limitations in favor of more direct prohibitions against national subsidization of seabed mining. See SEA/396, supra note 6, at 16.
61. The annual limit was set at 46,000 tons. ICNT/R2, supra note 3, art. 151,
para. 2(e).
62. Canada had argued that the formula, "intended as a safeguard could
clearly have the effect that in low market growth conditions it could permit seabed mining to take up more than 100% of world growth and thus force land-based
producers to cut back their production." Written Statement by the Delegation of
Canada, April 2, 1980, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/WS/4, at 3 (Apr. 10, 1980). For an overview of Canada's role in UNCLOS III negotiations, see Mestral & Legault, Multilateral Negotiation-Canadaand the Law of the Sea Conference, INT'L J., Winter
1979-80, at 47.
63. U.S. Delegation Report, New York, 1980, supra note 17, at 3.
64. ICNT/R2, supra note 3, art. 151, para. 1.
65. Informal Working Paper by the United States: An Approach to Interim
Protection of Investment, 1A/1 (Apr. 2, 1980); U.S. Delegation Report, New York,
1980, supra note 17 (attachment).
66. The mechanism would be a treaty provision charging the Preparatory
Commission, during an interim period, with receiving state-sponsored mining applications, granting priority to sites requested, and banking reserved sites for use
by the Enterprise or by developing countries. See U.S. Delegation Report, New
York, 1980, supra note 17, at 44. Various spokesmen within the mining industry
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agreement was reached on this proposal although the need to provide some form of security for investors during this interim pe67
riod was recognized.
Negotiations on the system of voting in the Council continued
throughout the New York meeting with little progress reported.
Delegates meeting in Negotiating Group Three and the Working
Group of 21 essentially agreed to retain the two-tiered approach
developed at the previous session,68 but did not agree on the
number of votes necessary to block decisions affecting sensitive
issues. 69 The composition and representation of special interest
groups on the Council were also debated, with little agreement
70
other than as to general approach.
The United States was particularly dissatisfied with the inclusion of a new provision that substantially altered the procedure
for approving plans of work submitted by mining applicants and
that upset the relationship between the decision-making organs of
the Authority.71 Otherwise, it was generally agreed that the revised text further clarified the relationship between the Council
72
and the Assembly, and the various functions of the Authority.
Many issues outstanding on the settlement of seabed disputes
were resolved at the New York meeting. The Group of Legal Experts on Sea-Bed Dispute Settlement submitted a compromise
have stated that passage of the Treaty would halt seabed production for most of
this decade unless more guarantees for investors were written into the draft version of the Treaty. Bus. WEEK, April 21, 1980, at 63.
67. U.S. Delegation Report, New York, 1980, supra note 17, at 44.
68. The two-tiered approach was not incorporated into either the ICNT/R1 or
the ICNT/R2, but was contained in the Chairman's Report for the Resumed
Eighth Session, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/91, at 57. For a summary of the two-tiered
approach, see Recent Developments 1979, supra note 4, at 706 n.86. See also
Oxman, supra note 4, at 16.
69. The United States would have settled for five negative votes to block an
action, but many developing countries favored a number closer to 10. SEA/396,
supra note 6, at 22.
70. U.S. Delegation Report, New York, 1980, supra note 17, at 27.
71. In decisions to award contracts, article 162, paragraph 2(j), would give
greater control to the Council at the expense of the Legal and Technical Commission. ICNT/R2, supra note 3, art. 162, para. 2(j). Compare id. with ICNT/R1,
supra note 4, art. 162, para. 2(j). The United States protested that this new provision had been added to the text without sufficient discussion or support. U.S. Delegation Report, New York, 1980, supra note 17, at 26.
72. U.S. Delegation Report, New York, 1979, supra note 24, at 25. See ICNT/R2,
supra note 3, arts. 157, 158, 160.

text on commercial arbitration that received general approval 73
and was incorporated into a new provision of the ICNT/R2.74 The
new provision made commercial arbitration compulsory at the request of either party to a dispute, with concurrent compulsory referral to the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber of the Law of the Sea
Tribunal. This would permit the Tribunal to retain jurisdiction
over all questions involving the interpretation of the Convention.75
The new text provided a choice of forums for resolution of disputes between States Parties.7 6 The Group further agreed that labor disputes should be resolved through a regulatory structure to
be established by the Preparatory Commission 77 and the Authority.78 Because technology transfer obligations under the revised

79
text would become part of a miner's contractual undertaking,
disputes concerning such obligations would also be subject to
compulsory arbitration.

Committee 11
Committee II completed most of the work on the continental
shelf and maritime boundaries at the New York meeting, although a few outstanding issues remained. The Chairman of the
73. The negotiations on the commercial arbitration issue involved essentially three interests. The United States and several Western European
States considered it important to provide for commercial arbitration for
contractual disputes. The [Group of 77] was concerned with maintaining
the integrity and unity of the jurisdiction of the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber over the interpretation of the Convention. The Soviet Union was concerned that, in preserving this integrity, the text should not inadvertently
permit entities other than States to use the arbitral tribunal to raise issues of the interpretation of the Convention ....
U.S. Delegation Report, supra note 17, at 30.
74. ICNT/R2, supra note 3, art. 188. For a discussion of the various dispute
settlement procedures adopted at UNCLOS, see Bernhardt, Compulsory Dispute
Settlement in the Law of the Sea Negotiations: A Reassessment, 19 VA. J. INT'L L.
69 (1979).
75. ICNT/R2, supra note 3, art. 188, para. 2. Compare id. with ICNT/R1, supra
note 4, art. 188, para. 2. The Law of the Sea Tribunal would consist of 21 members
of different nationalities, representing the principal legal systems of the world.
This Tribunal would operate through various small chambers, the largest of which
would be the 11-member Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber. Carnegie, The Law of the
Sea Tribunal, 28 INT'L CoP. L.Q. 669, 671-72 (1979).
76. Such disputes would be referred to either a Special Chamber of the Law of
the Sea Tribunal or to an ad hoc Chamber of the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber.
ICNT/R2, supra note 3, art. 188, para. 1.
77. The Commission would direct the establishment of the Authority and its
various organs. It would function between the time of signing and entry into force
of the Convention. See notes 114-119 and accompanying text infra.
78. SEA/396, supra note 6, at 26.
79. ICNT/R2, supra note 3, Annex III, art. 5, para. 3(e).
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Second Committee and Negotiating Group Six 80 reported success
on a compromise formula on coastal state jurisdiction over the
continental shelf that took account of oceanic ridges. 8 1 The new
formula closed a controversial loophole in the definition of the
continental margin where its natural features extend beyond the
generally accepted 200-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ).82
Negotiating Group Six also specified the functions to be per3
formed by a Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf.8
The proposed 21-member body would recommend limits to the jurisdiction of coastal states where the continental shelf extends beyond the EEZ.84 Provisions on exploitation of the continental
shelf beyond 200 miles otherwise remained unchanged. There
was heated debate, however, concerning the exemption from revenue sharing of those developing coastal states that would be net
importers of the off-shore mineral resource-typically oil.85 This

exemption remained the chief unresolved issue concerning the
continental shelf.
The United States was among a group of countries particularly
concerned about a movement to require prior authorization be obtained by warships exercising rights of innocent passage through
a coastal state's territorial sea.86 The ICNT/R1 had required prior
notification to the coastal state and had allowed that state to tem80. Report by Ambassador Andres Aguilar, Venezuela, Chairman of the Second Committee, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/L. 51.
81. The revisions to article 76 amended the definition of the continental shelf,
limiting its extension to 350 nautical miles where submarine ridges were to be
taken into account. ICNT/R2, supra note 3, art. 76.
82. The EEZ is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea and is under
the jurisdiction of the coastal state and subject to the legal framework established
by the Convention. Id. arts. 55-75. For a discussion concerning the development of
the EEZ concept, see Krueger, The Evolution of the 200-mile Exclusive Economic
Zone: State Practicein the Pacific Basin, 19 VA. J. LNr'L L 321 (1979).
83. A new Annex II of the ICNT/R2 details the functions of the proposed Commission.
84. ICNT/R2, supra note 3, art. 76, para. 8. Negotiating Group Six had agreed
upon a strengthened version of this paragraph that would have required the
coastal state to determine its limits "on the basis of" the recommendations of the
Commission. The ICNT/R2, however, retained the weaker language of the earlier
text.
85. Id. art 82, para. 3. The United States had sought to replace this exemption
with a scheme that would have permitted developing countries to opt out of the
revenue-sharing system for a fixed period. U.S. Delegation Report, New York,
1980, supra note 17, at 32.
86. Interview with Hugo Caminos, U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, Office of the Under-Secretary-General, U.N. Headquarters, New York (July 11, 1980).

porarily suspend innocent passage when "essential for the protection of security or for the safety of ships."8 7 This broad
discretionary language met with strong objection at the New York
meeting. As a result, the provision was amended to clarify the
conditions under which temporary suspension was justified, with
particular reference to "weapons exercises" by the coastal state. 88
The United States reintroduced an article 89 that would increase
the protection of marine mammals. The article received general
support and was incorporated into the revised text.9 0 The article
emphasized the role of international organizations and regional
cooperation in protecting whales and other marine mammals. 9 '
The method of delimiting boundaries between adjacent or opposite states was not resolved, 92 however, Negotiating Group Seven
did submit a new text defining the criteria for delimiting EEZ and
continental shelf boundaries between such states. 93 The new text
incorporated both the "equitable principles" approach and the
"equidistant" approach, within the overall requirement that the
delimitation agreement be effected "in conformity with international law."94 These changes improved the prospects for resolving
an issue which had threatened to substantially delay completion
and ratification of the Treaty by the coastal states directly affected.95 There was no redrafting of provisions affecting the related issue of interim measures and mechanisms settling
87. ICNT/Rl, supra note 4, art. 25, para. 3.
88. The revised text deleted the words "or for the safety of ships," in favor of a
more restrictive provision condoning suspension of innocent passage during
"weapons exercises" by the coastal state. ICNT/R2, supra note 3, art. 25, para. 3.
89. Id. art. 65. Compare id. with ICNT/R1, supra note 4, art. 65. The new version recognized greater rights of coastal states to regulate the exploitation of
marine mammals.
90. U.S. Delegation Report, New York, 1980, supra note 17, at 33.
91. For a discussion of efforts to foster regional cooperation in the regulation
of marine mammal kills incidental to fishing operations, see notes 319-21 and accompanying text infra. For a discussion of the role of environmental groups in
shaping the United States negotiating position, see Smith, Landfall at UNCLOS,
NAT'L PARKS CONSERVATION MAGAZINE, Jan. 1980, at 2.
92. SEA/396, supra note 6, at 30.
93. ICNT/R2, supra note 3, art. 74, para. 1, art. 83, para. 1. The principles governing delimitation of the territorial sea between adjacent or opposite states had
previously been resolved. Id. art. 15. For a discussion of the principle methods of
delimitation, see Adede, Towards the Formulationof the Rule of Delimitation of
the Sea Boundaries Between States with Adjacent or Opposite Coasts, 19 VA. J.
INT'L L 207, 211-21 (1979).
94. ICNT/R2, supra note 3, art. 74, para. 1, art. 83, para. 1.
95. Oxman, supra note 4, at 30. Because "[t]he function of the provisions on
the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf is to define the respective
rights and duties of any coastal state and all other states as a class in the same
area," the resolution of such boundary issues is essential to the advancement of
the Convention as a "package deal." Id. at 29.
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delimitation disputes. 96 It was generally assumed that the existing text would be acceptable once the more basic issue of delimitation criteria was resolved. 97 The Chairman reiterated his
assessment that only under a scheme of "compulsory conciliation
could the parties reach a compromise on this controversial issue." 9 8

Committee III
The Third Committee completed revisions to the regime for
marine scientific research, thereby concluding all substantive negotiations within its purview. The primary issue confronting the
Committee was the right to engage in research in areas of the
continental shelf beyond 200 miles from the shoreline.99 Researching states sought access to this entire area.10 0 Many coastal
states, however, maintained that their jurisdiction extended over
the entire breadth of the shelf.1o' The factions compromised, allowing coastal states an unchallenged right to prohibit foreign research in certain parts of their continental shelves beyond the 200
mile limit. In return, researching states would have greater access to all other parts of this region.l0 2
96. ICNT/R2, supra note 3, art. 74, paras. 3, 4, art. 83, paras. 3, 4.
97. U.S. Delegation Report, New York, 1980, supra note 17, at 33.
98. SEA/396, supra note 6, at 32.
99. Id. at 33.
100. Coastal states sought access to the continental shelf beyond 200 miles even
in areas where no operations were planned. Id. at 34.
101. A coastal state would have the right to regulate, authorize, and conduct
marine scientific research both within its EEZ and on its continental shelf. ICNT/
R2, supra note 3, art. 246.
102. Ordinarily, a coastal state would not have the right to withhold its consent
to the conduct of marine scientific research within its EEZ, or on its continental
shelf, by another state if that project:
(a) is of direct significance for the exploration and exploitation of natural resources, whether living or nonliving.
(b) involves drilling into the continental shelf, the use of explosives or
the introduction of harmful substances into the marine environment;
(c) involves the construction, operation or use of artificial islands, installations and structures...
(d) contains information communicated... regarding the nature and
objective of the project which is inaccurate or if the researching state...
has outstanding obligations to the coastal state from a prior research project.
Id. art. 246, para. 5.
Under the compromise document, the coastal state could designate certain areas
of its continental shelf, beyond 200 miles, in which it could begin exploitation or
detailed exploratory operations within a reasonable period of time. Within these
areas, the coastal state could exercise its discretion to withhold consent to re-

The Committee also limited the right of a coastal state to re03
Under the ICNT/
if the project
a
research
project
could
halt
R1, a coastal state
by
the coastal
failed to meet certain conditions established
0
4
The new text required an initial suspension period
state.
before the coastal state could order cessation of research activities.105 This suspension period would give the researching state a
reasonable time to comply with any conditions established by the
coastal state. 0 6 If the researching state failed to comply, the
coastal state could then order cessation.10 7
quire cessation of foreign research projects.

Informal Plenary
The Informal Plenary reached agreement on the text of the Preamble to the Convention. The Preamble harmonized the conflicting desire of some countries for a political text with that of others
for a brief non-substantive statement. 0 8 The primary controversy
concerned the language to be included in a preambular clause
enumerating the interests to be considered in the development of
a just and equitable international economic order. Developing
countries felt their interests should be emphasized, whereas the
United States felt the needs of mankind as a whole should be
stressed.10 9 The Informal Plenary agreed on a clause that recognized the needs of mankind generally, as well as the particular
search by foreign states. In all remaining areas of this region, the coastal state
could not withhold consent under subparagraph (a) of the above-quoted paragraph, although consent could be withheld under subparagraphs (b), (c), and (d).
Id. art. 246, para. 6. The designation of such areas by the coastal state would not
be subject to the dispute settlement procedures. Id. art. 296, para. 2(b).
103. Id. art. 253.
104. The coastal state could demand cessation if a research project were not beig conducted in the manner originally communicated. Cessation also would be
authorized if the researcher failed to give certain information concerning the project to the coastal state. Id.
105. Id. art. 253, para. 1. Where a major deviation from the procedure originally
authorized occurred, the coastal state could order cessation of research activities
without first ordering suspension. Id. art. 253, para. 2.
106. Id. art. 253, para. 3. If the researching state complied within a reasonable
time with the conditions established by the coastal state, the coastal state would
be required to lift the suspension. Id. art. 253, para. 5.
107. Id. art. 253, para. 3. A coastal state's suspension or cessation of a research
project would be subject to review. Either party to the dispute could submit the
decision to conciliation. Id. art. 296, para. 2(b).
108. Acting as a main committee, the Conference met in Informal Plenary on
several occasions. The Preamble accepted by the Conference developed out of
discussions based on two earlier texts. The first version in the 1977 negotiating
text was limited to a short, non-controversial statement. The second was a more
elaborate text proposed in 1978 by Fiji on behalf of the Group of 77. SEA/396,
supra note 6, at 37.
109. U.S. Delegation Report, New York, 1980, supra note 17, at 40.
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needs of developing countries." 0
A second issue dealt with by the Informal Plenary on the Preamble was whether the Convention should seek to "develop," or
whether it should seek to "give effect to" the principles of the
Sea-Bed Declaration.'' The Informal Plenary reached agreement
on a preambular clause that stated the Convention would seek to
develop the principles of the Sea-Bed Declaration."12 The Informal Plenary believed this language would emphasize the in3
dependent existence of the principles of the Declaration."
The creation of a Preparatory Commission was considered in
detail for the first time at the New York meeting." 4 The Informal
Plenary decided the Commission should function from the conclusion of negotiations until such time as the Convention entered
into force. The Commission was given a specific mandate to lay
the groundwork for the initial sessions of the Assembly, the
Council, and the Law of the Sea Tribunal." 5 This mandate included the establishment of a headquarters for the Authority.16
110. The clause that was finally incorporated read as follows:
Bearing in mind that the achievement of such goals will contribute to the
realization of a just and equitable international economic order which
would take into account the interests and needs of mankind as a whole
and, in particular, the special interests and needs of developing countries,
whether coastal or land-locked.
SEA/396, supra note 6, at 37.
111. The Sea-Bed Declaration was made in the General Assembly of the United
Nations in 1970. Its full title is the "Declaration of Principles Governing the SeaBed and the Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil thereof, Beyond the Limits of National
Jurisdiction." G-4. Res. 2749, para. xxv.
112. SEA/396, supra note 6, at 37.
113. Id. If the phrase "give effect to" had been used, the inference would have
been that the principles of the Sea-Bed-Declaration were dependent on the Convention to invest it with status. In this regard, the President of the Conference
stated:
It must be made clear that an expression had to be used which while
not affecting the question of the juridical status of those Principles, would
express the desire and intent of the Conference to provide for the application of the concept of the common heritage of mankind by establishing
through the present convention the institutional and legal framework and
machinery to give the concept practical shape and form.
Id.
114. U.N. Doc. A./Conf. 62/I- 55.
115. SEA/396, supra note 6, at 38. The mandate would be expressed in a resolution to be adopted by the Conference at its final session. Id.
116. Id. at 39. Other proposed functions included arrangements and the drafting of an initial budget for the Authority's secretariat. The attempt to establish a
definitive list of functions to be performed by the Prepatory Commission caused
considerable controversy, mainly because delegations were unsure of the outcome

Most significantly, the Commission was charged with the responsibility for adopting draft rules, regulations, and procedures for
the regulation of seabed mining.117 After extensive debate, the
Informal Plenary agreed that membership in the Preparatory
Commission would require signature or ratification of the Convention,118 and that the format for decision-making in the Commission would be left up to that body.119
Anticipating the completion of the negotiating stage of the Conference, the Group of Legal Experts on Final Clauses discussed
extensively the legal effect of the future Convention. The Group
submitted an annex of 13 tentative final clauses in its report to
the Conference.120 Because the delegates did not have time to
consider the report, no new Final Clauses were incorporated into
the revised text, and negotiations were deferred until the resumed session in Geneva.121 Similarly, although initial discussions were held on the adoption of certain General Provisions for
the Convention, the matter was taken up more fully in Informal
22
Plenary at Geneva.1
The Geneva Meeting, July 28 - August 29, 1980
Delegates negotiating at the resumed Ninth Session in Geneva
achieved major breakthroughs but were unable to complete an
approved formal text. The results of the meeting were incorpoof substantive negotiations still in progress. U.S. Delegation Report, New York,
1980, supra note 17, at 39.
117. Debate ensued over whether the draft rules, regulations, and procedures
should be adopted provisionally, pending consideration by the Authority, or
whether they should merely be recommended to the Authority. The United States
argued for the former approach because the provisional operations of rules, regulations, and procedures would provide certainty about the initial operation of the
seabed mining system. Id. at 39. Certain developing countries argued, to the contrary, that such an approach might compromise the powers of the Authority. Id.
The issue was left open until the Geneva meeting, at which time the Conference
adopted the U.S. position. See note 217 and accompanying text infra.
118. U.S. Delegation Report, New York, 1980, supra note 17, at 38. The United
States had favored this approach because it would have required members to
demonstrate an intent to be bound by the Convention. Certain delegations had argued for less restrictive criteria for Commission membership. Id.
119. Id. Some delegations had urged the establishment of a rigid decision-making structure for the Commission that would have required all decisions to be
made by consensus. SEA/396, supra note 6, at 39.
120. The report was not published as a Conference document. Id. at 40. The 13
proposed articles pertained to: the entry into force of the Convention, reservations, relation to other Conventions, amendments, denunciation, and the authenticity of texts. Id.
121. U.S. Delegation Report, New York, 1980, supra note 17, at 42. The Final
Clauses section of the ICNT/R2 reflected the work of the Expert Group prior to
the Ninth Session. ICNT/R2, supra note 3, arts. 299-303.
122. SEA/396, supra note 6, at 41. See notes 209-12 and accompanying text infra.
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rated into a third revision of the negotiating text, denominated
the Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea (Informal Text).123
Committee I
The major accomplishment of Committee 1124 negotiations was
agreement on a new voting procedure for the Sea-Bed Council.
The new procedure replaced the blocking vote approach with a
three-tiered system requiring consensus on a limited number of
sensitive issues. This system divided the substantive issues to be
decided by the Council into three categories according to their
sensitivity. Different voting majorities were specified for each category1 25
Developing countries continued to oppose any veto mechanism
as inherently discriminatory; but after extensive negotiations
they accepted the more democratic procedure of consensus.12 6
Under the new procedure, any of the thirty-six Council members,
rather than a select few, would have the power to block decisions
on sensitive issues. 127 The Soviet Union also found this formula
123. U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/WP. 10/Rev. 3 (Aug. 27, 1980) [hereinafter cited as
Draft Convention]. The President of the Conference explained that "[iut is a negotiating text and not a negotiated text, and does not prejudice the position of any
delegation." Explanatory Memorandum by the President of the Conference, U.N.
Doc. A/Conf. 62/WP. 10/Rev. 3/Add. 1, at 2 (Aug. 28, 1980). Most of the meeting
was taken up with informal negotiations, the results of which were reported to the
three Committees. In addition, the Informal Plenary, acting as a Main Committee,
developed new texts on General Provisions, the Settlement of Disputes, and Final
Clauses. The meeting concluded with three days of general debate. The Draft
Convention reflected the consensus texts reported from each of these negotiating
forums, as well as changes to the ICNT/R2 recommended by the Drafting Committee. Id.
124. The First Committee met formally at Geneva only once, and considered
the proposals reported out of the informal negotiations. In contrast to previous
sessions, the established Negotiating Groups did not meet in Geneva. Instead,
meetings were held by four informal negotiating groups, each addressing a different set of unresolved issues: the system of exploration and exploitation; financial
arrangements and the Statute of the Enterprise; decision-making in the Authority;
and production policies. The Working Group of 21 also met to review outstanding
"hard-core" issues. All of these groups reported to the Chairman of the First Committee. U.S. Delegation Report, Ninth Session of the United Nations Conference
on the Law of the Sea, Geneva, July 28 - August 29, 1980, at 1 (unpublished paper)
[hereinafter cited as U.S. Delegation Report, Geneva, 1980].
125. Draft Convention, supra note 123, art. 161., paras. 7(b)-(d).
126. Consensus is defined as the "absence of any formal objection." Id. art. 161,
para.7(e).
127. The United States had hoped to obtain a provision giving the five advanced
seabed mining nations the power to overturn a Council decision stopping the
award of a mining contract. Had this provision gained acceptance, the United

more acceptable because of its non-discriminatory character.
Some delegates expressed concern that a lack of consensus on
important issues could impede decisions. The Draft Convention
minimized the possibility of such deadlock by limiting the
number of issues in the consensus category and by providing for
8
expedited conciliation procedures.12
Consensus would be required prior to the adoption of: measures to protect land-based producers against adverse economic effects of seabed resource activities; 29 amendments to the system
of sea-bed mining; 3 0 and rules, regulations, and procedures of the
Authority.13 1 The latter category was particularly significant in
that it encompassed the most important set of decisions to be
made by the Council. For instance, consensus was required on all
new rules, regulations, and procedures governing prospecting, exploration and exploitation, financial management and internal administration of the Authority. This consensus category included
rules on borrowing and transfer of funds from the Authority to
the Enterprise.132
Most other substantive issues not included in the consensus
categories would require a three-fourths majority vote, 3 3 whereas
States and its four seabed mining allies--Japan, West Germany, Britain, and
France-would, in effect, be in a position to grant or deny a contract. N.Y. Times,
Mar. 27, 1980, § A, at 3, coL 4.
128. If within 14 days of the submission of a proposal to the Council the President ascertained that a formal objection would be made, 'he Council would be required to constitute a Conciliation Committee. This Committee would attempt to
reconcile differences and produce a proposal which could be adopted by consensus. The Committee would be required to report to the Council within 14 days.
Draft Convention, supra note 123, art. 161, para. 7(3).
129. Id. art. 162, para. 2(1), art. 150(g). Consensus would be required for any
Council recommendations to increase protection of developing countries' landbased mining industries by modifying the scheme of seabed production limitations. Id. art. 150(g).
130. Id. art. 161, para. 7(d), Part XI, arts. 133-91.
131. Id. art. 161, para. 7(d), art. 162, para. 2(n). The new uniform procedure contained in these two articles would provide all rules, regulations, and procedures be
adopted and provisionally applied by the Council pending consideration and approval by the Assembly. Id.
132. Id. art. 160, para. 2(f), art. 162, para. 2(n). The Group of 77 argued that all
matters on which rules, regulations, and procedures would be needed were not
reasonably foreseeable in advance of ratification. To meet this concern, the new
text was amended to indicate that the list of actions subject to rules, regulations,
and procedures of the Authority was not intended to be exhaustive. Id. Annex
I, art. 17, para. 1. Compare id. with ICNT/R2, supra note 3, Annex III, art. 17.
133. Draft Convention, supra note 123, art 161, para. 7(c). Significant among
Council actions in this category were: the issuance of emergency orders to prevent serious environmental harm (art. 162, para. 2(v)), 2selection among seabed
miners when production must be limited (art. 162, para. (p)), and recommendations to the Assembly on suspension of the rights and privileges of membership
(art. 162, para. 2(s)). U.N. Dep't of Pub. Information, Press Release SEA/422, at 6
(Sept. 2, 1980) [hereinafter cited as SEA/422].
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other less sensitive issues would require a two-thirds majority. 3 4
When not otherwise specified, residual issues would be decided
by consensus.13 5 If questions arise as to the appropriate voting
category for a particular issue, the higher or highest majority requirement would apply. 3 6 Decisions on procedural issues would
37
require a simple majority of members present and voting.
The United States delegation emphasized that the voting
formula compromise enhanced the possibility of resolving certain
other substantive issues. By providing that resolution of such
outstanding issues be set forth in the rules, regulations, and procedures of the Authority, the Draft Convention assured States of
a standing veto until consensus could be achieved. 3 8 An example
of this secondary impact was the tentative resolution of the controversy over the sharing of benefits derived from activities in the
International Sea-Bed Area. 3 9 Under a new provision, the Assembly would equitably distribute benefits consistent with the
rules, regulations, and procedures of the Authority.140 States Parties would thus be assured that politically sensitive proposals for
sharing economic benefits with "peoples who have not attained
full independence or other self-governing status" would be subjected to the scrutiny of consensus decision-making.141
Related to the resolution of voting procedures in the Council
was the revision of procedures for the approval of plans of
work.142 While the Group of 77 favored greater discretionary
134. Draft Convention, supra note 123, art. 161, para. 7(b). This category in-

cluded the decision to submit disputes to the Law of the Sea Tribunal or to binding arbitration. Id. arts. 188, 189.
135. Id. art. 161, para. 7(f).
136. Id. art. 161, para. 7(g).
137. Id. art. 161, para. 7(a).
138. U.S. Delegation Report, Geneva, 1980, supra note 124, at iv.
139. The resolution of this issue was reflected in revised article 140, read in conjunction with revisions to articles 160, paras. (2) (f), (j), (n), and article 160 para.
7(d).
140. Draft Convention, supra note 123, art. 160, para. 2(j), art. 162, para. 2(n) (i).
141. Id. arts. 140, 162, para. 2(n) (i). Despite apparent resolution of this difficult
question, the Conference President indicated the related issue of participation of

national liberation movements in the Convention was one of three outstanding issues to be dealt with at the New York meeting scheduled for March of 1981. SEA/
422, supra note 133, at 2. Decisions on the equitable sharing of revenue from exploitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 miles would also be subject to consensus in the Council. Draft Convention, supra note 123, art. 82.
142. See note 71 and accompanying text supra. Under the "split contracting
system," approval of plans of work would be considered separately from the allocation of a specific quota through a production authorization. U.S. Delegation Report, Geneva, 1980, supra note 124, at 20.

power for the Council, the United States argued that approval
should be left primarily to the Legal and Technical Commission. 143 A compromise was reached that would effectively limit
the Council's power to reject a recommendation of approval by
the Commission. To override a recommendation, the Council
would have to act by consensus. 4 4 If the Commission recommended disapproval, the Council could approve the plan of work
by a three-fourths majority.145 Another new provision ensured a
stable approval process by requiring that the Commission base its
recommendations solely on the grounds set forth in the Convention.24
The controversial provision concerning the sponsorship of multinational applicants was retained despite repeated objections by
the United States delegation. The provision required sponsorship
by both the incorporating state and the state that effectively controlled the corporation. The committee avoided impasse by providing that the criteria and procedures for implementing the
sponsorship system would require consensus in the Council.147
The scheme for transferring seabed mining technology was significantly revised at the Geneva meeting. The Group of 77 desired
elimination of the time limit on technology transfer, in contrast to
greater limitations urged by the industrialized countries. Compromise was reached to require technology transfer obligations in
all contracts concluded within ten years after the start of commercial production by the Enterprise. All transfer obligations would
expire after that time. 48 The United States accepted this revised
scheme after being assured by developing countries that they
would not press to include processing and marketing technology
in the transfer obligations. 149 It was decided that in cases of technology owned by third parties, the contractor's obligation would
be limited to situations where the contractor could acquire a legal
right to transfer without substantial cost.150 Less well received by
143. U.S. Delegation Report, Geneva, 1980, -upranote 124, at 20.
144. Consensus in this instance would not require the vote of the state making
the application or sponsoring an applicant. Draft Convention, supra note 123, art.
162, para. 2(j) (i). Compare id. with ICNT/R2, supra note 3, art. 162, para. 2(j).
145. Draft Convention, supra note 123, art. 162, para. 2(j) (ii).
146. Id. art 165(b), Annex II, art. 6. The revised text required decision-making
procedures of the Commission be established by the rules, regulations, and procedures of the Authority. Id. art. 165, para. 11. Compare id. with ICNT/R2, supra
note 3, art. 163, para. 10.
147. Draft Convention, upra note 123, Annex ]Il art. 4, para. 2.
148. Id. Annex III, art. 5, para. 7. Compareid. with ICNT/R2, supra note 3, Annex HI, art. 5, para. 7.
149. U.S. Delegation Report, Geneva, 1980, .supranote 124, at 9.
150. Draft Convention, supra note 123, Annex III, art. 5, para. 3(c). Compareid.
with ICNT/R2, supra note 3, Annex IHI art. 5, para. 3(c). Where substantial cost
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the United States and other industrialized countries was the Conference decision to retain a modified version of the "Brazil
clause." 5 1 Although all sides continued to exhibit some dissatisfaction during plenary debate, 52 negotiations on the technology
transfer scheme were deemed closed by the end of the Ninth Session.
The Group on Production Limitations reconvened during the
Geneva meeting to further consider ways to accommodate the
concerns of land-based producers. These negotiations resulted in
strengthened protections through a provision prohibiting seabed
mining states from establishing easier market access than that
available to land-based producers. 53 At the same time, the
Group emphasized the developmental goals of the Authority in a
new provision calling for the "development of the common heri54
tage for the benefit of mankind as a whole."'
The Group on Production Limitations also addressed the particular concerns of the poorer land-based producing countries which
would be adversely affected by new production from the seabed.
Revisions aimed at a system of compensation to these countries
were incorporated, requiring the Authority to initiate studies and
to establish "measures of economic adjustment assistance."1 55
Although the overall scheme of production limitations appeared
to be accepted, several land-based producing countries continued
5 6
to express dissatisfaction during plenary debate.
The French delegation reintroduced three amendments to
strength the quota and anti-monopoly provisions for seabed mining contracts. Although these particular proposals were not accepted, the Conference did agree on a general provision
was involved, the Enterprise would reimburse the contractor. U.S. Delegation Report, Geneva, 1980, supra note 124, at 8.
151. Draft Convention, supra note 123, Annex III, art. 5, para. 3(e). See notes
15-17 and accompanying text supra.
152. SEA/422, supra note 133, at 15.
153. Draft Convention, supra note 123, art. 150(i).
154. Id. art. 150(g). This language was intended to dispel the impression that
seabed production might become a residual source of supply. U.S. Delegation Report, Geneva, 1980, supra note 124, at 5.
155. Draft Convention, supra note 123, art. 151, para. 4. Compare id. with
ICNT/R2, supra note 3, art. 151, para. 4. Certain African States had sought additional changes to this compensation scheme, which would have placed the funding
burden on the developed countries rather than on the Authority. U.S. Delegation
Report, Geneva, 1980, supra note 124, at 6.
156. Canada, Australia, and several African States voiced continued concern
about the inadequacy of protections. SEA/422, supra note 133, at 12-13.

consistent with France's position which granted the Authority the
power to adopt "other procedures and criteria" in addition to the
maximum density limitations. 5 7 The imposition of gross seabed
production limitations would necessarily limit the number of
qualified miners that could be accepted. hi such a case, the Authority would be directed to "avoid discrimination against any
State or system," as well as to prevent monopolization, in applying its selection criteria.158
The procedure for future review of the seabed mining system
underwent little change at Geneva. Some developing countries
unsuccessfully reintroduced the controversial proposal to allow
the future Review Conference to impose a moratorium on seabed
mining.' 59 The Conference did, however, revise the procedure for
entry into force of amendments to the seabed mining system.
The revisions gave states more time to conform their own laws to
amendments promulgated at the Review Conference.160 Another
change to the text made it clear that the Review Conference could
take action only by proposing amendments or revisions to the
Convention.161
Although the financial terms of seabed mining contracts remained largely intact, 62 the system of financing the Enterprise
was extensively revised.163 The negotiators modified the scheme
for determining the initial capital needed by the Enterprise. To
provide a more definite scheme in advance of ratification, the Preparatory Commission would be required to specify the capital
157. Draft Convention, supra note 123, Annex I, art. 6, para. 5. The provision
applied after the expiration of the interim period covered by the production limitation. Any action taken under the provision would be pursuant to the rules, regulations, and procedures of the Authority. Id. France had been particularly
concerned about the failure to apply the anti-monopoly and quota provisions to
those parts of the seabed reserved for the Enterprise and developing countries.
SEA/422, supra note 133, at 15.
158. Draft Convention, supra note 123, Annex HI, art. 7, para. 5. Compare id.
with ICNT/R2, supra note 3, Annex II, art. 7, para. 4.
159. SEA/422, supra note 133, at 18.
160. Draft Convention, supra note 123, art. 155, para. 4. Amendments adopted
five years after the commencement of the Conference would enter into force 12
months after ratification by two-thirds of the States Parties. Id. The earlier text
had provided for entry into force of the amendments after a 30-day period. ICNT/
R2, supra note 3, art. 155, para. 5.

161. Draft Convention, supra note 123, art. 155, para. 5. Compare id. with
ICNT/R2, supra note 3, art. 155, para. 4.
162. Although several Western European countries had proposed substantial
reductions in the payments to be made by the contracting miners, the Group of 77
blocked this effort, claiming the existing text to be the "absolute bottom line."
SEA/422, supra note 133, at 16.
163. Draft Convention, supra note 123, Annex IV, art 11. Negotiations were carried on by the Working Group of 21 and by a smaller group presided over by the
chairman of the former Negotiating Group Two.
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needed to finance the Enterprise's first integrated mining system
4
in the draft rules, regulations, and procedures of the Authority.16
To provide future flexibility,165 the modifications also required the
Preparatory Commission to set out the "criteria and factors" for

any necessary adjustment of the stated figure, taking into account
66
inflation and other unforeseen costs.1

A second change to the Enterprise financing system ensured
sufficient funding in the event the Convention lacked universal
participation. The negotiators dropped the twenty-five percent
ceiling on supplementary financing previously agreed to, and replaced it with a more flexible provision requiring the Assembly to
adopt by consensus measures for dealing with a potential
67
shortfall in funding.1

A schedule for calling up the funds promised to the Enterprise
was specifically addressed for the first time in the new text. Compromise was reached on a two-step procedure proposed by the
Netherlands delegation. First, States Parties would be required
to deposit irrevocable promissory notes with the Enterprise at the
time of ratification in the amount of their total share of interestfree loans. Thereafter, the Governing Board of the Enterprise
would prepare schedules of its financial needs, and draw against
the promissory notes following these schedules.168 The negotiators also agreed on revisions dealing with the adoption of a repay164. Draft Convention, supra note 123, Annex IV, art. 11, para. 3(a). Compare
id with ICNT/R2, supra note 3, Annex IV, art. 11, para. 3(a). The Preparatory
Commission's draft rules, regulations, and procedures would be provisionally applied by the Authority when the Convention first entered into force. Draft Convention, supra note 123, art 308, para. 4.
165. The Group of 77 stressed the need for flexibility. U.S. Delegation Report,
Geneva, 1980, supra 124, at 12.
166. Draft Convention, supra note 123, Annex IV, art 11, para. 3(a).
167. Id. Annex IV, art. 11, para. 3(c). Compare id. with ICNT/R2, supra note 3,
Annex V, art. 11, para. 3(c). See note 51 and accompanying text supra. This compromise was reached after extensive debate. While the Group of 77 argued that a
25% ceiling might not meet the needs of the Enterprise, the United States and the
Soviet Union objected to any obligatory supplementary funding in excess of their
U.N. assessments. U.S. Delegation Report, Geneva, 1980, supra note 124, at 3.
Since the text of the Convention did not establish any fixed obligation to meet the
shortfall, it was understood by the United States that "any supplementary fund established by the Assembly would have to be voluntary." Id.
168. Draft Convention, supra note 123, Annex IV, art. 11, para. 3(d). The Group
of 77 rejected an earlier proposal by the United States that would have given a potential veto over Enterprise operations to industrialized countries. The United
States proposal would have applied consensus decision-making to requests for
loan advancements. U.S. Delegation Report, Geneva, 1980, supra note 124, at 13.

ment schedule for loans to the Enterprise. 69 In advising the
Assembly and the Council on adoption of schedules, the Governing Board would be required to give particular emphasis to ensuring the financial independence and successful performance of
70
the Enterprise.1
Renewed controversy over tax immunities for the Authority led
to a complete revision of the negotiating text on that subject.171
Under the revised text, the Authority would be exempted from direct taxation when acting within the scope of its official activities.
Although the Authority would not be exempt from indirect taxes
in the form of charges for services rendered, States Parties would
be required to take measures "to the extent practicable" to reimburse the Authority for such taxes.

72

Additionally, a revised pro-

vision on tax immunity for staff members would allow States
Parties to tax the salaries only of their own nationals. 73
Few changes were made regarding the composition and functions of the Council. Proposals to give better representation to
certain groups of states were strongly opposed because of the impact such changes would have on the delicately balanced voting
formula.174 The new text did change one aspect of the developing
countries' representation on the Council but the overall composition of that body remained unchanged. 7 5 In addition, the Conference accepted a new provision that would provide a caucus voting
procedure for the nomination of Council members. The procedure would ensure effective representation of special interest and
regional groups.' 7 6 The Conference also agreed to longer terms
and stiffer qualifications for membership on the Council's two
Commissions in order to enhance the independence and quality
169. Draft Convention, supra note 123, Annex IV, art. 11, para. 3(f). Compare
id. with ICNT/R2, supra note 3, Annex IV, art. 11, para. 3(f). The Group of 77 had

consistently rejected efforts of certain industrialized countries to have the loan repayment schedule drawn up by the Preparatory Commission in advance of ratification. SEA/422, supra note 133, at 16. See note 53 and accompanying text supra.
170. Draft Convention, supra note 123, Annex IV, art. 11, para. 3(f).
171. Id. art. 183. Compare id. with ICNT/R2, supra note 3, art. 183. The earlier
text had left this subject open for negotiation between the Authority and the host
countries. See note 46 and accompanying text supra.
172. Draft Convention, supra note 123, art. 183, paras. 1, 2.
173. Id. art. 183, para. 3.
174. Several smaller industrialized states had pressed for better representation
through an enlargement of the Council's membership. SEA/422, supra note 133, at
10.
175. Among the special interests of developing countries represented on the
Council would be a new category of potential land-based producers of minerals
also found on the seabed. Draft Convention, supra note 123, art. 161, para. I(d).
Compare id. with ICNT/R2, supra note 3, art. 161, para. 1(d).
176. Draft Convention, supra note 123, art. 161, para. 2(c).
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of those bodies.177
The Group of 77 renewed its sharp opposition to unilateral deep
seabed mining legislation, such as that recently enacted by both
the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany. 7 8 Those
two delegations responded that the legislation was an interim
measure necessary to maintain investment interest in the seabed
mining industry.179 Because both countries prohibit exploitation
in the International Sea-Bed Area until 1988, the interim period
arguably would leave sufficient time for the UNCLOS Convention
to enter into force and thereby supersede these national laws.180
Nevertheless, opposition to the passage of the national mining
legislation made it impossible for the United States to incorporate
further protections for interim investment into the overall treaty
package.181 The stalemate in negotiations on preparatory investment protection persuaded the Conference leadership to defer
that issue, together with the details of the Preparatory Commis82
sion's mandate, until the Tenth Session.
Committee 11
The Second Committee met only once during the resumed
Ninth Session and limited discussion to a review of the Drafting
Committee's recommendations. Although most formal matters
within the Committee's purview were deemed closed, intensive
private negotiations were held on unresolved issues. These included the delimitation of the EEZ and continental shelf bounda-

ries between opposite or adjacent states, and jurisdiction over
stocks of fish found both within and beyond the EEZ.183
177. Id. art. 163, paras. 3, 7. Compare id. with ICNT/R2, supra note 3, art. 164,
paras. 3, 7.
178. SEA/422, supra note 133,1 at 18.' See notes 232-37 and accompanying text
infra. For a discussion of the effect unilateral deep seabed mining legislation has
had on developing countries see Lee, Deep Seabed Mining and Developing Countries, 6 SYRACUSE J. INT'L I. CoM. 213 (1979).
179. SEA/422, supra note 133, at 18.
180. See notes 238-41 and accompanying text infra.
181. U.S. Delegation Report, Geneva, 1980, supra note 124, at 38. The Group of
77 was concerned that any treaty provisions designed to protect interim investment would give existing private ventures a disproportionate advantage over the
Enterprise. Id.
182. Id. Active consultations between sessions were anticipated on both of
these issues.
183. Id. at 23. A number of delegations were annoyed that the Second Committee had not met formally to reconsider various issues that had been deemed
closed. SEA/422, supra note 133, at 20.

Negotiators made little progress in finalizing principles for establishing boundaries between opposite or adjacent states. Sides
remained clearly divided between those who favored the "equidistance-line" approach, and those who favored the additional
consideration of "equitable principles."184 No definitive scheme
5
emerged and the existing open-ended formula was retained.18
The negotiators did resolve certain misunderstandings about the
relation of existing international law to the problem of delimitation; including the kinds of "other circumstances" that could be
considered in defining boundaries. Nevertheless, it appeared
likely that unless a breakthrough occurred at the Tenth Session, a
number of states affected by this controversy would seek reservations at the time of ratification.18 6
Argentina, Canada, and a number of other states continued to
urge textual changes favoring the coastal states' authority to conserve stocks of fish which range both inside and outside the
EEZ.187 Although no revisions were made,188 the need to elaborate the dispute settlement procedures for conserving such fish
stocks was generally recognized.18 9
Two other Committee 11 issues resurfaced at Geneva, but substantial opposition to the proposals prevented any changes to the
negotiating text. The first was a renewed insistence by some developing countries on a requirement of prior notification or authorization for warships crossing the territorial seas. 190 The
proposal was labeled a "Conference breaker" by the major mari184. U.S. Delegation Report, Geneva, 1980, supra note 124, at 19. See notes 92-98
and accompanying text supra.
185. Draft Convention, supra note 123, arts. 74, 83. Compare id. with ICNT/R2,
supra note 3, arts. 74, 83.
186. SEA/422, supra note 133, at 19; U.S. Delegation Report, Geneva, 1980, .supra
note 124, at 25.
187. U.S. Delegation Report, Geneva, 1980, supra note 124, at 24. Under both the
ICNT/R2 and the Draft Convention, the coastal state and the foreign fishing state
were required "to agree upon measures necessary for the conservation of these
stocks in the adjacent area." Draft Convention, supra note 123, art. 63, para. 2.
188. Many delegations were concerned about the implications the CanadianArgentinian proposal would have for expanding coastal state jurisdiction beyond
the 200-mile EEZ. U.S. Delegation Report, Geneva, 1980, supra note 124, at 24.
189. Id. The U.S. Delegation noted there was a need to study the question of
conforming the text of article 63 with that of article 117 on the "duty of States to
adopt with respect to their nationals measures for the conservation of the living
resources of the high seas." Id. at 25.
190. SEA/422, supra note 133, at 20. All three of the latest negotiating texts provided for "innocent passage" by warships through the territorial seas of coastal
states. Draft Convention, supra note 123, art. 17. See notes 86-88 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of the effect of UNCLOS on the mobility of naval
warships, see Richardson, Power, Mobility and the Law of the Sea, 58 FORniGN
AFF.902 (1980).
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time powers, and was subsequently withdrawn. 9 1
The second issue concerned unvindicated demands of geographically disadvantaged states for more effective guarantees of
their equitable participation in the new international ocean regime. 92 These states demanded more protection of their rights of
access to the sea, greater participation in the exploitation of the
living resources of the EEZ, and the creation of a Common Heritage Fund to be financed by a percentage of coastal state revenues derived from exploitation of the EEZs and the continental
shelves.193
Committee 11
Discussions in the Third Committee did not include any substantive negotiations, because it was agreed that all such negotiations had been concluded during the Spring session in New
York 9 4 Instead, the Committee focused its attention on proposed drafting changes. 95 Debate ensued when it again became
apparent that certain of these changes would have a substantive
effect on the text of the Convention. The Chairman quickly resolved this debate by ruling that substantive changes would not
be allowed. 96
Informal Plenary
The Informal Plenary agreed to a set of General Provisions and
191. U.S. Delegation Report, Geneva, 1980, supra note 124, at 23-24.
192. SEA/422, supra note 133, at 20. An article in the New York Times observed
that "by allowing coastal states to claim ownership of ocean riches up to 200 miles
from their shores, the United Nations is effectively helping the rich get richer
since the major beneficiaries will include the United States, Canada, the Soviet
Union, Britain, France and Japan." N.Y. Times, Aug. 30, 1980, § A, at 4, col 1. For a
discussion of the position taken by the Organization of African Unity on the landlocked states issue see Ferreira, The Role of African States in the Development of
the Law of the Sea at the Third United Nations Conference, 7 OCEAN DEV. INT'L L,
89, 104-07 (1979).
193. SEA/422, supra note 133, at 20. The latter proposal for a Common Heritage
Fund had been introduced at previous sessions. Land-locked States urged the
Conference to reconsider the proposal at its next session. Id.
194. Id. at 21.
195. The Committee considered 169 proposed drafting changes and accepted
135. U.S. Delegation Report, Geneva, 1980, supra note 124, at 26.
196. The Chairman prevented the reopening of substantive negotiations by applying the rule that no changes would be adopted over the objection of any single
delegation. Id.

included them in the Draft Convention.19 7 One of these provisions was aimed at protecting archaeological and historical objects recovered from the seabed. 98 The provision gave coastal
states authority to monitor the removal of such objects within
their contiguous zones. 199 A second provision authorized states to
refuse to supply information to another state200 when disclosure
of the information would be contrary to the essential interests of
the former state's security. 201 Other provisions called for the
peaceful use of the seas 2 02 and good faith compliance with the ob203
ligations of the Convention.
Under the auspices of the Informal Plenary, the Conference
also concluded its substantive negotiations on provisions dealing
with dispute settlement.204 A restructuring of the text consolidated in one section the circumstances under which disputing
parties would be obliged to submit to compulsory conciliation.2 0 5
Conciliation would be required for maritime boundary disputes,
fishery disputes within the EEZ, and disputes over certain marine
scientific research matters.20 Other disputes would be subject to
binding judicial or arbitral procedures. 2 07

197. U.N. Doc. A/ConL62/L.58.
198. Draft Convention, supra note 123, art. 303. This topic had been the subject

of numerous proposals in the past. It was of particular interest to Mediterranean
nations, whose coastal waters possess many valuable objects. SEA/422, supra
note 133, at 26.
199. The continguous zone extends 24 nautical miles from the baseline from
which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. Draft Convention, supra note
123, art. 33.
200. Id. art. 302.
201. The Conference President asserted that this article would not detract from
the Convention's obligations concerning the transfer of technology and marine scientific research, or the settlement of disputes thereon. SEA/422, supra note 133, at
27.
202. This provision required all States Parties, in exercising their rights and obligations under the Convention, to refrain from threatened or actual use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. Draft Convention, supra note 123, art. 301.
203. All States Parties would be required to discharge in good faith their obligations under the Convention. The provision also required State Parties to exercise
their rights under the Convention in a manner which would not constitute an
abuse of rights. Id. art. 300.
204. Most of these provisions were included in Part IV of the Draft Convention.
The only substantive change to the negotiating text at the New York meeting was
with regard to the number of conciliators a country could appoint to a conciliation
commission. Id. Annex V, art. 3(b).
205. Id. arts. 297-98. Compulsory conciliation would require a party to submit
to conciliation, but would not necessarily result in a binding recommendation.
SEA/422, supra note 133, at 28.
206. The expanded use of compulsory conciliation had first been advocated by
Argentina at the New York meeting of the Ninth Session. Id.
207. Draft Convention, supra note 123, arts. 286-96. Before permitting recourse
to adjudicatory or compulsory conciliation procedures, the Convention would re-
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The Informal Plenary also incorporated a new provision detailing the procedural machinery for the Convention's special use of
compulsory conciliation. Under this innovative procedure, notice
of intent to institute conciliation by one party would oblige the
other party to submit to compulsory conciliation. Failure to submit to conciliation would not impede the proceeding.20 8
The Informal Plenary extensively reviewed the work of the
Group of Legal Experts on Final Clauses. 209 Most of the Final
Clauses met with general acceptance 210 and debate over the mandate of the Preparatory Commission and over participation in the
Convention was deferred to the Tenth Session.21 ' All sixteen Final Clauses detailing the legal effect of the Treaty were incorporated into the text of the Draft Convention.2 12 The most
fundamental issue concerned the procedure for ratification and
entry into force of the Convention. Conference delegates agreed
the Convention should remain open for signature in Caracas for
two years and that only sixty ratifications would be needed for
2 13
the Convention to become law.

On the related question of achieving balanced representation
on the Council, the Conference was faced with the issue of how
best to prevent distortion that might result from a low number of
ratifications. Even if the Treaty received the requisite sixty signatures, a low number of ratifications could make it difficult for
States Parties to achieve the mandated composition of the Counquire all disputants to submit to preliminary procedures aimed at voluntary settlement. Id. arts. 279-85.
208. Id. Annex VI, arts. 11-14.
209. The deliberations of this Expert Group were supplemented at the resumed
session by meetings of the Informal Plenary. SEA/422, supra note 133, at 21.
210. U.S. Delegation Report, Geneva, 1980, supra note 124, at 32.
211. The participation controversy centered on the question of whether any entities other than states should have the right to accede to the Convention and
thereby share in the "common heritage" benefits. Three distinct types of entities
were vying for participation: regional organizations, such as the European Economic Community dependent territories on the verge of gaining independence,
such as the U.S. Trust Territories of the Pacific; and national liberation organizations, such as the South-West Africa People's Organization and the Palestinian
Liberation Organization. While there was general agreement that regional organizations and dependent territories could be accommodated in a limited fashion, the
proposed participation of liberation organizations continued to meet fierce opposition. SEA/422, supra note 133, at 25.
212. Draft Convention, supra note 123, arts. 304-20.
213. Id. arts. 304, 306.

cil.214 The Conference decided to retain the language of the Expert Group's proposal, drafted in New York, despite concern over
21 5
the vagueness of that formula.
As a key aspect of the "package deal" 2 16 approach to acceptance
of the Convention, the Conference retained a clause calling for
the provisional application of the rules, regulations, and procedures drafted by the Preparatory Commission. 217 The Informal
Plenary further sought to protect the consensus nature of the
Convention by incorporating the general principle that no reservations or exceptions would be permitted except where expressly
provided for in particular articles. 2 18 To balance this general prohibition, and to facilitate ratification, the Informal Plenary would
permit states to make declarations or statements not purporting
to alter the legal effect of particular provisions.219 The Conference
also encouraged ratification by deleting an earlier draft's five-year
freeze on denunciations. Under the new Draft Convention, a
State Party could give notice of its intent to denounce the Convention at any time, with the denunciation taking effect one year
after notification. 220
The Informal Plenary also developed a comprehensive scheme
for amending the Convention. The new scheme was set out in the
Final Clauses. It established two methods for proposing and
adopting amendments to provisions related to non-seabed matters. The more formal method would require convening an
amendment conference, if favored by at least one half of the
214. The composition of the 36-member Council is specified in article 161 of the
Draft Convention.
215. The article stated that "[t]he first Council shall be constituted in a manner
consistent with the purpose of article 161 [on Council composition and voting procedures] if the provisions of that article cannot be strictly applied." Draft Convention, supra note 123, art. 308, para. 3. To allow a greater number of ratifications,
the entry into force of the Convention would be delayed until 12 months after the
date of the sixtieth signature. Id. art. 308.
216. U.S. Delegation Report, Geneva, 1980, supra note 124, at 33.
217. Draft Convention, supra note 123, art. 308, para. 4. Pending adoption of
rules, regulations, and procedures by the Assembly, the provision helped maintain
continuity of rights and obligations during the interim, and to promote an orderly
transition of administrative responsibilities. U.S. Delegation Report, Geneva, 1980,
supra note 124, at 33.
218. Draft Convention, supra note 123, art. 309. The effect of a reservation is to
exempt a state from the application of a particular provision. Among provisions
most likely to expressly permit reservations would be those dealing with the determination of EEZ and continental shelf boundaries between opposite or adjacent states. Id. art. 309, note 1. See notes 69-71 and accompanying text supra.
219. Draft Convention, s-upra note 123, art. 310.
220. Id. art. 317, para. 1. The five-year freeze had been proposed in the report of
the Expert Group meeting in New York at the beginning of the Ninth Session.
SEA/396, supra note 6, at 40. Denunciation would not affect any rights or duties of
a state, if they had accrued prior to denunciation or had existed independent from
the Convention. Draft Convention, supra note 123, art. 317, paras. 2, 3.
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States Parties. This procedure would be available after ten years
from entry into force of the Convention. Adoption of amendments would proceed by consensus or, if consensus were not
achievable, by a two-thirds majority vote of the Assembly. 22 1 Alternatively, the Convention would provide for a simplified procedure, not requiring a special conference. A proposed amendment
would be considered adopted if after one year no formal objections were registered. 222 Under either procedure, the adoption of
non-seabed amendments would require ratifications by two-thirds
of the States Parties and would then enter into force only as to
the ratifying States Parties. 3
The procedure for amending seabed provisions would require
consensus in the Council and a two-thirds majority approval by
the Assembly. 224 To avoid having two divergent schemes for seabed mining, the Conference agreed that adopted seabed amendments should enter into force for all States Parties one year after
being ratified by three-fourths of the States Parties.2 2
The new text on Final Clauses also included provisions detailing the Convention's relation to other international agreements.
According to these provisions, the Convention would supercede
the three 1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea, but
would not alter the rights and obligations of States Parties arising
under other compatible agreements. 226 Yet another Final Clause
required States Parties to agree that there could be "no amendments to the basic princple relating to the common heritage of
221. Id. art. 312, paras. 1, 2.

222. Id. art. 313.
223. Id. art. 316, paras. 1, 3. States adhering to the Convention after the entry
into force of an amendment would be expected to adhere to the Convention as
amended. Id. art. 316, paras. 4, 6.
224. Id. art. 314, para. 1. This would be an alternative procedure to amendments adopted through the Review Conference as described in notes 48-50 and accompanying text supra. Draft Convention, supra note 123, art. 155. An
amendment adopted pursuant to article 314 would be subject to the condition it
would not prejudice the system of seabed mining pending the Review Conference.
Id. art. 314, para. 2.
225. Id. art. 316, para. 5. Amendments pertaining to the Law of the Sea Tribunal also would enter into force for all Parties after ratification by three-fourths of
the Assembly. Id. The Tribunal was renamed the "International Tribunal for the
Law of the Sea." SEA/422, supra note 133, at 29.
226. Draft Convention, supra note 123, art. 311, paras. 1, 2. Two or more States
Parties could modify or suspend provisions of the Convention between themselves
if such agreements did not deviate from the basic principles of the Convention or
affect the rights and duties of other States Parties. Id. art. 311, para. 3.

",227
mankind .
The Drafting Committee met informally throughout both Ninth
Session meetings, as well as during a special intersessional meeting in June. The Committee harmonized provisions drafted by
the Main Committees and brought the six official language versions of the Convention into conformity with the original English
draft. The authority of the Drafting Committee was limited to lin228
guistic interpretation.
At the close of the Ninth Session, the Conference President indicated three oustanding issues to be addressed by the Tenth
Session, scheduled to meet in March 1981. These included the
resolution for the creation of a Preparatory Commission, the
United States proposal for the establishment of preparatory investment protection, and proposals for the participation in the
Convention by entities other than states. 2 29 Also left for resolution was the precise formulation of provisions regarding the delimitation of maritime boundaries between opposite or adjacent
states. It was generally agreed, however, that the latter issue
could be resolved without postponing completion of the Conven-

tion.230

The Conference approved a timetable which provided for a
Tenth Session in New York in March 1981, preceded by an intersessional meeting of the Drafting Committee. During the first
half of the Tenth Session, the Conference was scheduled to discuss outstanding issues and recommend textual changes. The
second half of the meeting was to be devoted to formalizing the
status of the completed Draft Convention. This included a period
for the submission of formal amendments in the event consensus
on a completed negotiating text should prove impossible. Finally,
a concluding session in Caracas was scheduled where formal
statements could be made and the Convention would be opened
for signature. 23 '
227. Id. art. 311, para. 6. This statement of basic principles emerged as a compromise after some delegations had argued for a provision declaring the "common
heritage" principle to be a "preemptory norm" of international law. U.S. Delegation Report, Geneva, 1980, supra note 124, at 34. Two standard provisions were incorporated, designating the Secretary-General of the United Nations as the
depository of the Convention, and declaring all six official language texts to be authentic. Draft Convention, supra note 123, arts. 319-20.
228. SEA/422, supra note 133, at 29. Members of the Drafting Committee were
cautioned about making any substantive changes. Id. See note 196 supra.
229. SEA/422, supra note 133, at 2.
230. U.S. Delegation Report, Geneva, 1980, supra note 124, at iii.
231. SEA/422, supra note 133, at 3.
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DEVELOPMENTS BEYOND THE CONFERENCE

UnilateralDeep Seabed Mining Legislation
Legislation governing deep seabed mining has been introduced
in every session oftthe United States Congress since 1972.22 On
June 28, 1980, President Carter signed into law the Deep Seabed
Hard Minerals Resources Act.233 This legislation establishes a

comprehensive interim program to encourage and regulate development of deep seabed hard mineral resources until a supersed23 4
ing international agreement is implemented.
232. Kitos, A Report on Legislation: The Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources
Act, 10 LAw. OF THE AMERICAS 963 (1978).
233. The Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, 30 U.S.C-A. §§ 1401-1473
(Supp. 1980) (enacted as Pub. L. No. 96-283, 94 Stat. 555 (1980)) (hereinafter cited
as Mineral Resources Act). This act was introduced as I.LR 2759 on March 8, 1979,
by Representatives Murphy (New York), Breaux, Udall, Santine, Zablocki, Bingham, Bonker, Ullman, Pritchard, Young (Alaska), Serwinski, and Conable. The
bill was referred to the House Committees on Merchant Marine and Fisheries,
Foreign Affairs, Interior and Insular Affairs, and Ways and Means.
On August 2, 1979, the House Committee of Interior and Insular Affairs ordered
that the bill, as amended, be reported to the House of Representatives with a recommendation that it be approved. H.R. REP. No. 411, pt. 1, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1979). A similar recommendation was made by the Committee on Merchant
Marine and Fisheries after the bill was amended and reported by them on August
17, 1979. H.R. REP. No. 411, pt. 2, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
On November 2, 1979, the House Ways and Means Committee ordered that the
provision of the bill requiring an excise tax on any revenues from deep seabed
mining be reported to the House of Representatives with a recommendation that it
be approved. H.R. REP. No. 411, pt. 3, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
On May 15, 1980 the House Foreign Affairs Committee ordered that the bill, as
amended, be reported to the House of Representatives with a recommendation
that it be approved. HRL REP. No. 411, pt. 4, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
The bill passed the House on June 9, 1980. The Senate amended the bill and
passed it on June 23, 1980. On June 25, 1980, the House agreed to the Senate
amendments. Among the substantive Senate amendments agreed to by the House
was a provision requiring processing plants for the retrieved minerals to be located within the United States, and a provision requiring the Secretary of State to
negotiate with foreign nations to establish a "stable reference zone" where no
mining would occur. The zone would be used as a reference for evaluating the environmental effects of ocean mining. The President signed the bill on June 28,
1980.
On August 17, 1980, a bill similar to the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources
Act was passed by West Germany. This act is set forth in 19 INT'L LEGAL MATERiALS 1330 (1980).
234. Mineral Resources Act, supra note 233, at § 2 (Findings and Purposes), § 3
(International Objectives of the Act).
Section 2(b) states the purpose of the Act(b) Purposes. The Congress declares that the purposes of this Act
are..
(1) to encourage the successful conclusion of a comprehensive Law of

Under this legislation, United States mining companies are required to obtain from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) a license to explore the seabed and a
permit to commercially recover the minerals.2 3 5 In granting the license, the administrator of NOAA must make determinations
concerning the applicant's mining capabilities. Diplomatic and
environmental effects of the mining must be taken into account as
well.

23 6

There is concern this legislation will hamper treaty prospects at
the Third United Nations Conference on Law of the Sea.2 3 7 In or-

der to minimize this possibility, certain amendments have been
proposed. One such amendment postpones by six years the date
commercial recovery of minerals can begin.23 8 Also proposed is a
the Sea Treaty, which will give legal definition to the principle that the
hard mineral resources of the deep seabed are the common heritage of
mankind and which will assure, among other things, nondiscriminatory
access to such resources for all nations;
(2) pending the entering into force of such a treaty, to provide for the
establishment of an international revenue sharing fund, the proceeds of
which shall be used for sharing with the international community pursuant to such treaty;
(3) to establish, pending the ratification by, and entering into force with
respect to, the United States of such a treaty, an interim program to regulate the exploration for and commercial recovery of hard mineral resources of the deep seabed by United States citizens.
For a discussion concerning the questionable legality of the act under international law, see Recent Developments 1979, supra note 4, at 714.
235. Mineral Resources Act, pupra note 233, at §§ 1411-1428.
236. The administrator must find that the applicants are financially responsible
and that they have the technical expertise to mine. The administrator must also
find that the mining activities will not interfere with the operations of other countries exercising freedoms of the high seas, conflict with international obligations of
the United States, or result in "significant adverse effect" on the environment. If
circumstances change so that mining actvities become detrimental, the administration can modify restrictions in the permit or license, of suspend a license or
permit. Id. at §§ 1413(c), 1415(a).
237. Wall St. J., June 27, 1980, at 4, col. 1. In 1979, the Carter Administration unsuccessfully asked the Senate to delay further action on legislation that would allow United States companies to mine the seabed. The Senate passed S. 493 on
December 19, 1979. At the request of the State Department, the President urged a
similar delay in the House. The House Foreign Affairs Committee agreed to postpone consideration of the bill until Elliot Richardson, the United States Ambassador to the LOS conference, was able to report back in April. 38 CONG. Q. 160
(1980). For a discussion of the reaction of Third World Countries to this legislation, see Oxman, supra note 4, at 8.
238. H.R. REP. No. 411, pt. 4, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1980). When appearing
before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Mr. Richardson suggested three amendments be included in the bill (1) a provision changing from July 1, 1982, to January 1, 1988, the date commercial recovery of minerals could occur; (2) a provision
narrowing the definition of "commercial recovery" to exclude demonstration and
testing activities; (3) a provision requiring the Secretary of the Interior, within a
year of enactment of the bill, to propose legislation protecting interim investments
made for exploratory purposes while the LOS treaty was being negotiated. Mr.
Richardson believed that including these amendments would prevent the bill from
damaging the treaty process. The committee subsequently incorporated the
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tax of 3.75 percent of the "imputed" value of minerals removed
from the deep seabed.239 These tax revenues are to be held in a
"Deep Seabed Revenue Sharing Trust Fund." Any contributions
required to be made to the international community by an inter240
national deep seabed treaty will be paid out of this fund.
The Deep Seabed Hard Minerals Resources Act also includes a
provision aimed at protecting investments made by prospective
mining companies. 241 It was felt this provision would be necessary to obtain the support of industry for such legislation. 242 The
legislation does not, however, include the industry provision compensating miners for losses incurred as a result of the proposed
international treaty.24 3
amendments into the bill. Deep Seabed Hard MineralsResources Act: Hearingson
H.R. 2759 Before the House Comm. on ForeignAffairs, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
239. Mineral Resources Act, supra note 233, at §§ 4495-4498. The amount of the
tax is 3.75 percent of the imputed value of the removed resource. For purposes of
these sections, imputed value means 20 percent of the fair market value of the
commercially recoverable metals and minerals. Id. at § 4497(a).
240. Mineral Resources Act, supra note 233, at § 403(d). This provision also
provides the tax will terminate ten years after enactment of the seabed law. If an
international deep seabed treaty is not in effect with respect to the United States
at that time, the Trust Fund will be available for such purposes as Congress shall
decide. Mineral Resources Act, supra note 233, at § 403(e).
241. Mineral Resources Act, supra note 233, at § 1441(a). This provision states
Congress intends that an international agreement signed by the United States provide "assured and nondiscriminatory" access to the seabed for United States citizens. Industry reportedly favored a provision adopted by the Interior Committee
which would give greater protection for any investments in deep seabed mining.
However, the provision adopted by the Interior Committee was not enacted into
law. 38 CONG. Q. 163 (1980).
242. Deep Seabed Hard Minerals Resources Act- Hearings on H.R. 2759 Before
the House Comm on Interior and Insular Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 107-09
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Hearingson H.R. 2759, May 1, 1979]; Deep Seabed Hard
Minerals Resources Act; Hearings on H.R. 2759 Before the House Comm. on
Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 149-55 (1979), [hereinafter
cited as Hearingson H.R. 2759, May 22, 1979].
243. Mining industry spokesmen asked for a provision compensating them for
any losses incurred as a result of the proposed international treaty on deep seabed mining. Hearings on H.R. 2759, May 1, 1979, supra note 242; Hearings on H.R.
2759, May 22, 1979, supra note 242. See also Young, Inducementfor Exploration by
Companies, SYRACUSE J. OF IN'L LAw & CoM. 199, 205 (1979). The Carter administration, however, has strongly opposed such guarantees on the ground that the
Federal Government should not set a precedent by promising to compensate certain segments of the private sector for financial losses that might be occasioned by
future federal actions taken to advance the national interest. Richardson, Deep
Seabed Mining Legislation, DEPT STATE BULL, April 1978, 54, at 54.

Antarctic Treaty on Marine Living Resources
Representatives from fourteen countries 24 4 met in Canberra,
Australia in May of 1980 to draft a convention on the conservation
of Antarctic Marine Living Resources.2 45 The primary issue facing the members of the conference concerned the harvesting of
small shrimp-like krill found throughout the Antarctic Ocean.
Conservationists contended that because krill form the basis of
the Antarctic food chain, overfishing the krill could have catastrophic ecological effects on the Antarctic Continent.24 6 The
whale, seal, fish, squid and bird populations would all be af247
fected.
In answer to this concern, the convention has adopted an
"ecosystem" approach, rather than the "maximum sustainable
yield" formula commonly used in fishery management. 243 Under
the ecosystem approach, ecological relationships between krill
and dependent species must be considered in determining the
amount of krill permitted to be harvested. 249 The "maximum sus244. The countries present at the meeting were: Argentina, Australia, Chile,
France, East Germany, West Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Poland,
South Africa, USSR, United Kingdom, and the United States. This group includes
11 of the 12 states originally parties to the Antarctic Treaty of 1955, Dec. 1, 1959, 12
U.S.T. 794, T.I.S. No. 4780, 702 U.N.T.S. 71. The states originally parties to the
Antarctic Treaty of 1955 were: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan,
New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, USSR, United Kingdom, and the United
States. Id.
245. The convention and related documents are set forth in 19 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 837 (1980).

246. Wash. Post, Sept. 17, 1979, § A, at 2, col 1. But see London Times, Feb. 1,
1980, at 10, col. E. According to a report on the management of Southern Oceans
by the International Institute for Environment and Development, the development
of the krill fishery as an industry is unlikely to be sufficiently profitable to pose
any serious threat to the ecology of the Antarctic region. Id.
247. Krill are the major food supply of five species of whale, three species of
seal, twenty species of fish, three species of squid, and many species of bird.
Wash. Post, Sept. 17, 1979, § A, at 2, coL 1.
248. The Antarctic Convention states:
Any harvesting and associated activities in the area to which this convention applies shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of
this convention and with the following principles of conservation:
(a) prevention of decrease in the size of any harvested population to
levels below those which ensure its stable recruitment. For this purpose
its size should not be allowed to fall below a level close to that which ensures the greatest net annual increment;
(b) maintenance of the ecological relationship between harvested, dependent and related populations of Antarctic marine living resources and
the restoration of depleted populations to the levels defined in sub-paragraph (a) above; and,
(c) prevention of changes or minimization of the risk of changes in the
marine ecosystem which are not potentially reversible over two or three
decades, ....
Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, art. II, § 3,
[hereinafter cited as Antarctic Convention].
249. Jackson, A11for the Want of Krill, 13 OcEANs 2 (1980).
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tainable yield" approach does not take such relationships into ac2 50
count; only the individual species being regulated is examined.
be made
Decisions concerning management of the fisheries will 251
by a commission comprised of parties to the convention.
Fishery Disputes
In July of 1980 Mexico seized three United States tuna boats
fishing within Mexico's 200 mile zone. 252 Although it maintains a
200 mile fishing zone as well,2 5 3 the United States has asserted

that international law exempts migratory fish such as tuna from
coastal states' jurisdiction in the 200 mile zone.254 In response to

the seizure, the United States placed an embargo on all Mexican
tuna. 25

5

The two countries have been negotiating to resolve the

dispute. 256 Currently, Mexico is considering a suggestion by the
United States that a permanent inter-American commission be
created to manage the tuna fishery.25 7
250. Id.
251. Antarctic Convention, supra note 248, at art. VIL Critics of the treaty feel
that it establishes a decision making procedure which is too cumbersome. The
critics feel that this procedure will bar the commission from making adequate decisions concerning conservation of the krill. Managing the Antarctic Ecosystem, 5
OcEANs 64 (1980).

252. L.A. Times, July 10, 1980, § A, at 1, col. 5; LA Times July 11, 1980, § A, at 1,
col. 2. For a discussion of seizures of U.S. tuna boats in 1979 by Canada, Costa
Rica, Mexico, and Peru, see Recent Developments 1979, supra note 4, at 719-20.
253. 16 U.S.C. § 1811 (West Supp. 1980).
254. It is the sense of the Congress that the United States Government
shall not recognize the claim of any foreign nation to a fishery conservation zone (or the equivalent) beyond such nation's territorial sea, to the
extent that such sea is recognized by the United States, if such nation(2) fails to recognize and accept that highly migratory species are to
be managed by applicable international fishery agreements, whether or
not such nation is a party to any agreement.
16 U.S.C. § 1822 (e) (West Supp. 1980).
255. LA Times, July 12, 1980, § A at 1, col. 1. United States law requires that
upon the seizure of a United States vessel fishing for migratory fish within the 200
mile exclusive economic zone of a foreign country, an embargo be placed on all
fish or fish products from the country involved. 16 U.S.C. § 1825 (West Supp. 1980).
256. L.A. Times, July 10, 1980, § A, at 1, col 5.
257. Id. In the past, tuna catches were regulated by the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission, of which the United States and Mexico were members. In
1977 Mexico and Costa Rica withdrew from the commission. Over the past two
and one-half years, negotiations have been underway with Mexico for a revised inter-American arrangement for tuna. To date, these negotiations have been unsuccessful LA Times, April 13, 1980, § E, at 5, col 4; see also L.A. Times, July 10, 1980,
§ A, at 1, coL 5.

Legislation was introduced in Congress 25 8 to reduce foreign
fishing within United States waters by as much as fifteen percent
a year beginning in 1981.259 There is some question as to the le-

gality of the bill under international law. The Draft Convention
on the Law of the Sea allows a coastal state to determine its own
capacity to harvest the living resources of its exclusive economic
zone by taking into account all relevant factors, 260 but the relevant factors are not clearly specified. The committee on Merchant
Marine and Fisheries opines that a coastal state need only consider its own economic interest in determining the allowable forbe sufficient to
eign catch. The committee believes this would
26 1
meet the requirements of international law.
Britain is currently engaged in a fishing dispute with the European Economic Community.2 62 Britain claims that much of the
waters within the European Economic Community's collective 200
mile fishing zone are British,263 and that Britain should therefore
258. H.R. 7039 was introduced on April 15, 1980. Hit 7039, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1980).
259. IR 7039 established 1979 as a base harvest year for each fishery. Beginning in 1981, foreign fishing is to be reduced by an amount equal to 15 percent of
the base harvest for each fishery. After the 1981 season, if United States vessels
harvest 75 percent or more of a phase-out reduction factor amount determined for
the immediately preceding harvest season, foreign fishing is to be phased out in
an amount equal to 15 percent of the base harvest for each fishery. If United
States vessels only harvest 50 to 75 percent of the phase-out reduction factor
amount, foreign fishing is only to be reduced by 10 per cent of the base harvest. If
United States vessels harvest less than 50 per cent of the phase-out reduction factor, foreign fishing is not to be reduced for that season.
260. The convention states that in managing the fishery stocks, the coastal state
shall take into account all relevant environmental and economic factors. Draft
Convention, supra note 123, Add. 1.
261. The report states that under Articles 61 and 62 of the ICNT/R2, the coastal
state is given discretion to determine the allowable catch of the living resources of
its exclusive economic zone. The report goes on to state that, in making this determination, the ICNT/R2 allows the coastal state to rely on numerous factors, including its own economic interests. Also cited in the report are fishing agreements
with Mexico and Japan in which the United States government is given discretion
to set quotas on foreign fishing. H.R. REP. No. 1138, pt. 1, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 23-30

(1980).
262. London Times, Jan. 30, 1980, at 6, col G. See also London Times, May 31,
1980, at 13, col A, for a discussion of Britain's failure to concede "equal access" to
fishing waters at the Luxembourg summit, where Britain's contribution to the European Economic Community budget was discussed.
The European Economic Community was established by the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11. The original parties to this treaty were Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and
the Netherlands. On January 1, 1973, Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom
became parties to the treaty.
263. British waters contain about 60 percent of all the fish caught in the European Economic Communities collective 200 mile fishing limit. London Times, Jan.
30, 1980, at 6, col. G.
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be given preferential treatment.26 4 The European Economic Com-

munity has taken the position that a claim of preferential treatment is invalid under Article 7 of the European Economic
Community Treaty 2 65
On March 29, 1979 the United States and Canada signed an

266
agreement concerning control of East Coast fishery stocks.

This agreement was aimed at codifying conservation and management rights of the respective countries over fishery stocks in the
countries' exclusive economic zones. 2 67 Due to opposition by the
United States fishing industry, ratification of the treaty appears
unlikely.2 68 The industry objects that the treaty gives Canada too
2 69
large a share of the catch.
Legislation on Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion

Legislation has been enacted by the United States authorizing
the NOAA to issue permits for ocean thermal energy conversion

(OTEC) facilities. 270 The legislation also enables industry to ob-

tain loan guarantees to develop pilot or demonstration models of
264. Britain's position is that its fisheries should be granted: an exclusive 12
mile sea zone; preference in a zone between 12 to 50 sea miles; and favored treatment in the allocation of national quotas in the European Economic Community.
Diw Wochenbericht, Nov. 29, 1979, at 497-501, translated and reprinted in 110
WORLDWIDE REPORT, LAW OF THE SEA 71 (1980).
265. West Germany asserts that Britain's claim of preferential treatment is invalid under the ban on discrimination in Article 7 of the European Economic Community Treaty. Id.
266. This agreement, entitled United States-Canada East Coast Fishery Agreement and Boundary Treaty, was referred to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on May 3, 1979. Hearings were held in April of 1980.
267. Control over fisheries in the United States and Canada's respective exclusive economic zones has been a hotly contested issue since the two countries declared 200 mile fishing limits in 1977. MacLean's, Apr. 21, 1980, at 27.
268. N.Y. Times, Apr. 16, 1980, § A, at 4, col. 1. See also MacLean's, June 30, 1980
at 24.
269. One of the primary objections to the treaty is that it entitles Canada to
more than 73 percent of the scallop catch. Objections have also been raised about
the permanent nature of the treaty. The fishing industry would like to see a provision allowing the government to alter quotas or redraw fishing jurisdictions at a
later date. Christian Sci. Monitor, July 9, 1980, at 4, col 1.
270. The Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 91019167 (Supp. 1980) (enacted as Pub. L. No. 96-320, 94 Stat. 974 (1980)). This act was
introduced as S. 2492 on March 27, 1980 by Senators Inouye, Cannen, Hollings,
Magnuson, Mathias, Matsunoya, Packwood, Sarbanes and Stevens. The bill was
referred to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation. The
Senate passed the bill on July 2, 1980. The House passed the bill on July 21, 1980.
The bill was signed into law by the President on August 3, 1980. The purpose of
the bill is to establish a licensing and permit system for ocean thermal energy con-

such facilities. 271 The legislation raises questions of international
concern. Placement of OTEC facilities within a coastal state's 200
mile exclusive zone may subject such facilities to the jurisdiction
of the coastal state. 272 On the other hand, if these facilities are
placed on the high seas they may infringe on the rights of coun273
tries using the high seas.

Extension of Sovereignty over Fishingand TerritorialWaters
Unilateral extension of sovereignty over fishing waters continues. Australia, 274 Malaysia, 275 Indonesia, 276 and Namibia277 have
announced an extension of the fishing zones around their counversion (OTEC) facilities and plantships within the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. S. REP. No. 721, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1980).
OTEC facilities obtain their energy from the sea by using the temperature difference between surface water and water 2,999 feet down. The warm water is used
to vaporize a fluid which powers a turbine. The fluid is then reliquified using the
cold water. L. Times, Apr. 18, 1980, § A, at 4, col 1.
271. Pub. L. No. 96-320, supra note 270, at § 230. This loan guarantee provision
is an important step in encouraging industry to participate in the costly experimental stage in the development of OTEC facilities. S. REP. No. 721, 96th Cong.,
2nd Sess. (1980).
272. At present, the law of the sea provides that ocean thermal energy, because
of its inexhaustible nature, defies property or quasi-property rights. Nevertheless,
Article 56 of the Draft Convention 1980 states:
1. In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal state has (a) sovereign
rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the seabed and
subsoil and the superadjacent waters, and with regard to other activities
for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the pro(emphasis adduction of energy from the water, currentsand winds; ....
ded).
Therefore, under the Draft Convention, coastal states would have jurisdiction over
OTEC facilities within their exclusive economic zone. See, Booda, Ocean Energy
Challenges Technology: Grows, 19 SEA TECHNOLOGY 10, 14 (1978).
273. Under Article 2 of the Convention on the High Seas, UN Soc. A/1 Conf. 13/
L. 53, freedom on the high seas exists to the extent that such freedom is recognized by the general principles of international law, and is exercised with reasonable regard for the interests of other states in their exercise of the freedom of the
high seas. The issue, therefore, is whether or not OTEC facilities can be operated
with reasonable regard for the interests of other states. For a discussion of this
issue see H. KNIGHT, J. NYHART, & R. STEIN, OCEAN THEPMAN ENERGY CONVERSION
53-58 (1977) and Comment, Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion on the High Seas:
Toward an InternationalRegulatory Regime, 18 SAN DIEGO L, REv. 473 (1981).
274. Christian ScL Monitor, Nov. 6, 1979, at 7, col 1. Japanese fishermen will be
the chief beneficiaries of this extension, because the Australian government has
agreed to allow them to fish for tuna within the new 200 mile zone. Sydney Morning Herald, Oct. 18, 1979, at 3, translatedand reprinted in 110 WO.DWIDE REPORT,
LAw OF THE SEA 34 (1980).
275. Kuala Lumpur International Service, Broadcast at 0630 GMT, Apr. 28, 1980,
translatedand transcribed in 120 WORLDWIDE REPORTS, LAw OF THE SEA 15 (1980).
276. Hong Kong AFP, Broadcast at 1134 GMT, Mar. 21, 1980, translatedand transcribed in 116 WORLDWME REPORTS, LAw OF THE SEA 10 (1980).
277. Johannesburg Domestic Service, Broadcast at 1115 GMT, Nov. 5, 1979,
translatedand transcribed in 110 WORLDWIDE REPORTS, LAw OF THE SEA 29 (1980).
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tries from 12 to 200 miles. These unilateral declarations have led
to a dispute between the Australian and Indonesian governments
concerning placement of the boundaries for these zones. 278 Ecuador has announced an extension of its fishing zone.279 Nicaragua
has also announced an extension of its territorial sea to 200
miles. 280 Nicaragua's claim conflicts with Columbian claims in the
adjacent waters. 28 1 In an attempt to resolve this dispute, Nicara-

gua has agreed to negotiate with Columbia concerning delimitation of the surrounding waters. 282

Delimitationof the ContinentalShelf
Negotiation continues concerning delimitation of the continental shelf in the southeast Asian region.2 83 Indonesia has agreed to
negotiate with both Malaysia284 and Vietnam 285 to delimit the
continental shelf surrounding the three states. Malaysia and
278. The Australian government has reached an agreement with Papua New
Guinea concerning the establishment of maritime boundary lines; however, no
agreement has been reached with Indonesia. Pending such an agreement, the
Australian government has decided to draw median lines in accordance with Australia's maximum legal entitlement. The Indonesian government has sent a note
of protest. Christian Sci. Monitor, Nov. 6, 1979, at 7, col 1. For a discussion of the
Indonesian government's position on this matter, see Sina Harapan (Jakarta), Oct.
10, 1979, at 1, translated and reprinted in 110 WORLDWIDE
SEA 52 (1980).

REPORTS, LAW OF THE

279. Madrid, EFE, Broadcast at 0109 GMT, Jan. 18, 1980, translated and transcribed in 113 WORLDWIDE REPORTS, LAW OF THE SEA 15 (1980). Ecuador has extended its extensive fishing zone from 60 to 100 nautical miles. Ecuador generally
forbids foreign fishing inside the exclusive fishing zone. Foreign ships may, however, catch up to 800 tons of fish provided they sell 20 percent of this catch to Ecuador. Id.
280. Barricada (Managua), Dec. 24, 1979, at 7, translated and reprinted in 112
WORLDWIDE REPORTS, LAW OF THE SEA 3 (1980).
281. The Nicaraguan decree claims sovereignty over the Serrano, Quitasueno,
and Concordon Keys. These keys were ceded to the Columbian government in
1928 pursuant to the Barcenas-Menses-Esguerra Treaty. La Prensa (Managua),
Dec. 26, 1979 at 1, translatedand reprinted in 112 WORLDWIDE REPORTS, LAW OF
THE SEA 5 (1980). It is the position of the ruling junta in Nicaragua that this treaty

is invalid because it was signed pursuant to American intervention in Nicaragua.
Id.
282. Madrid, EFE, Broadcast at 1925 GMT, Feb. 12, 1980, translatedand transcribed in 114 WORLDWIDE REPORTS, LAW OF THE SEA 29 (1980).
283. For a discussion of prior negotiations concerning delimitation of the continental shelf in the south-east Asian region, see Recent Developments 1979, supra
note 4, at 716-17.
284. Antara (Jakarta), Broadcast at 0721 GMT, Mar. 11, 1980, translated and
transcribed in 115 WORLDWIDE REPORTS, LAW OF THE SEA 23 (1980).
285. Kuala Lumpur Domestic Service, Broadcast at 1130 GMT, Mar. 25, 1980,
translatedand transcribed in 117 WORLDWIDE REPORTS, LAW OF THE SEA 1 (1980).

Thailand have agreed to establish a joint authority for the exploration and development of mineral resources on the continental
shelf off their eastern coasts. 286 This joint authority will continue
until the two countries are able to reach a permanent delimitation
287
agreement.
A dispute has developed over delimitation of the continental
shelf in the South China Sea. Japan and South Korea have
agreed to jointly develop oil resources off their coasts. 88 North
Korea, 289 China, 290 and Taiwan 2 91 have protested the agreement.
Both China 292 and Taiwan2 93 claim sovereignty over the area in
which Japan and South Korea intend to drill. South Korea and
Japan, on the other hand, assert that they have sovereignty over
the area because of an agreement between their governments delimiting the continental shelf.294 The Chinese maintain that the
delimitation agreement is illegal under international law because
it is based on midline principles of delimitation.295
National Legislation Aimed at Curbing Ocean Pollution
Pollution of the oceans continues to be a threat to both marine
286. For a discussion concerning the operation of this joint authority see Business Times (Kuala Lumpur), Feb. 8, 1980, at 1, translated and reprinted in 119
WORLDWIDE REPORT, LAW OF THE SEA 14 (1980).

287. Id.
288. Tokyo radio, KYODO, Broadcast at 0547 GMT, May 1, 1980, translatedand
transcribed in 120 WORLDWIDE REPORT, LAW OF THE SEA 7 (1980).
289. Pyongyang radio, KCNA, Broadcast at 0426 GMT, May 15, 1980, translated
and transcribed in 121 WORLDWIDE REPORTS, LAW OF THE SEA 9 (1980). The protest by the North Koreans is based on the claim of the North Korean government
to South Korea. Id.
290. Beijing Review (Beijing), May 19, 1980, at 6, translatedand reprintedin 121
WORLDWIDE REPORT, LAW OF THE SEA 13 (1980).
291. Hong Kong radio, AFP, Broadcast at 0728 GMT, May 13, 1980, translated
and transcribedin 121 WORLDWIDE REPORT, LAW OF THE SEA 16 (1980).
292. Beijing Review (Beijing), May 19, 1980, at 6, translatedand reprintedin 121
WORLDWIDE REPORT, LAW OF THE SEA 13 (1980). The Chinese position is that,
under international law, delimitation of the continental shelf may only occur
through consultation and agreement between the countries concerned. Id.
293. Hong Kong radio, AFP, broadcast at 0718 GMT, May 13, 1980, translated
and transcribed in 121 WORLDWIDE REPORTS, LAW OF ma SEA 16 (1980).
294. The South Korean government has stated that its agreement with Japan to
delimit the continental shelf in the South China Sea is legal under international
law. Nevertheless, the government has also stated its willingness to negotiate
with China on this issue. Tokyo radio, KYODO, May 9, 1980, translatedand transcribed in 120 WORLDWIDE REPORT, LAW OF THE SEA 10 (1980).
295. Beijing Review (Beijing), May 19, 1980, at 6, translatedand reprinted in 121
WORLDWIDE REPORT, LAW OF THE SEA 13 (1980). Delimitation based on midline
principles exists where all points of a boundary are an equal distance from the
baseline of the respective countries. In the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases,
the International Court of Justice ruled that delimitation of the continental shelf
need not be based on midline principles; special circumstances may also be taken
into account. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases. f 1969] LC.J. 3.
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and human life.296 Responding to this threat, President Carter
asked that a 1.6 billion dollar fund be established to clean up both
oil and chemical hazards. 297 Congress responded by introducing
various bills aimed at cleaning up oil and chemical pollution.298
One House bi11299 provides a comprehensive system of liability
and compensation for oil pollution,30 0 as well as for pollution
296. Marine experts of the United Nations warned that human life is
threatened by ocean pollution. These experts maintain that pollutants discharged
into the ocean enter the food cycle, thereby endangering human life. LA. Times,
Apr. 27, 1980, § 8, at 10, col 5.
297. Wash. Post, June 14, 1979, § A, at 2, col. 1. Ocean pollution arises from two
main sources. By far the largest source of pollution is land based, mostly from
chemical runoff and industrial waste. Vessels are the second main source of ocean
pollution, primarily due to oil discharge. Richardson, Prevention of Vessel-Source
Pollution,2 OCEANS 2 (1980).
298. S. 1480 was introduced in the Senate on July 11, 1979. S. 1480, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1979). Two bills were introduced in the House of Representatives, H.R.
85 on January 15, 1979, and H.R. 7020 on April 2, 1980. H.iR 85, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1979); H.R. 7020, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
As originally introduced, H.R. 7020 was intended to clean up inactive hazardous
waste sites and was inapplicable to pollution of navigable waters. In November of
1980, S. 1480 was incorporated into H.R. 7020. H.R. 7020 was then passed by the
Senate and the House. On December 9, 1980, the bill was sent to the President
The bill was approved on December 11, 1980 and became Pub. L No. 96-510.
299. H.R. 85 was introduced by Representatives Biaggi, Murphy (New York),
Treen, Snyder, Jones (North Carolina), Pritchard, De La Garza, Young (Alaska),
Patterson, Bauman, Ginn, Lent, Hubbard, Evans (Delaware), Bonker, Forsythe,
D'Amours, Emery, Oberstar, Dorman, Hughes, Trible, Mikuski, Bonior, Akaka,
Bowen and Zeferetti. The bill was referred jointly to the Committee on Merchant
Marine and Fisheries, and the Committee on Public Works and Transportation.
Additional members joined as co-sponsors after the bill's introduction.
On May 15, 1979, the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries ordered that
the bill, as amended, be reported to the House of Representatives with a recommendation it be approved. H.R. RP. No. 172, pt. 1, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
On May 16, 1980, the Committee on Public Works and Transportation also ordered that the amended bill be reported to the House of Representatives with a
recommendation it be approved. H.R REP. No.. 172 pt. 2, 96th Cong. 2nd Sess.
(1980).
The bill was then referred to the House Ways and Means Committee at the request of Committee Chairman Ullman. On June 20, 1980, the Ways and Means
Committee ordered that the bill be reported to the House of Representatives with
a recommendation it be approved. H.R. REP. No. 172, pt. 3, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1980). The bill passed the House on September 19, 1980.
300. HIR 85, supra note 298, at § 104. Under this bill, owners are strictly liable
for damages arising from the discharge of oil by their vessel or facility. Liability is
limited, however, shipowners are liable for up to 30 million dollars, depending on
the size of their ship; owners of deep water ports are liable for up to 50 million
dollars; and owners of offshore facilities such as oil wells are liable for the total
removal cost incurred plus 50 million dollars. Id.

caused by the release of hazardous substances into the water.30 '
The proposed legislation also would establish a fund to finance
cleaning up oil spills

stances. 303

30 2

and pollution caused by hazardous sub-

A similar bill introduced in the Senate has sub-

sequently been enacted into law.3 0 4

The Senate version

established a much larger clean up fund305 but limits its coverage
3 06
to pollution caused by hazardous substances.
301. H.R. 85, supra note 298, at Title III. Liability under Title III is the same as
liability for oil pollution under § 104. Id.
302. H.R. 85 establishes a 375 million dollar fund to clean up oil spills. The fund
is established by imposing a fee of 1.3 cents per barrel on al oil entering or leaving
the United States. H.R. 85, supra note 298, at § 102. Currently, an international
fund for the compensation of oil pollution damage exists. International Fund for
Compensation of Oil Pollution Damage, openedfor signature Feb. 1, 1977, Leg/UA/
Conf. 2/4, 16 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 621 (1977). The Carter administration, however, did not ratify the Fund Convention because it believed the compensation
limit was too low. Richardson, Prevention of Vessel-Source Pollution, 3 OcEANs 58,
59 (1980). The compensation limit of this convention was recently increased to 63
million dollars, and if H.R. 85 fails to pass this year the United States may seek to
ratify the Fund Convention. Id.
303. H.R. 85 establishes a 375 million dollar fund which is used to clean up pollution caused by the release of hazardous substances into the waterways. The
fund is established by imposing an excise tax on primary petrochemicals at a rate
of 1.18 dollars per ton, and an excise tax on certain inorganic substances at a rate
of 31 cents per ton. H.R. 85, supra note 298, at § 301 (c).
304. The Comprehensive Environmental Responses, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510 [hereinafter cited as Comprehensive Environmental Responses Act] was introduced as S. 1480 and as H.R. 7020. S. 1480 was
introduced by Senators Culver, Muskie, Stafford, Chafee, Randolph, and Moynihan. The bill was referred to the Committee on Environment and Public Works.
Additional members joined as co-sponsors after the bill's introduction.
On July 11, 1980, the Committee on Environment and Public Works ordered that
the bill, as amended, be reported to the Senate with a recommendation it be approved. S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
On November 24, 1980 H.R. 7020 was amended by the Senate to include the language of S. 1480. H.R. 7020 was then passed by the Senate. On December 3, 1980
the amendments to H.R. 7020 were agreed to by the House.
305. The Comprehensive Environmental Response Act establishes a 1.6 billion
dollar Hazardous Substance Response Trust Fund. 1.38 billion dollars of this fund
is established by collecting from each manufacturer, importer, or generator of a
hazardous substance, a fee on each unit of hazardous substance produced, manufactured, or imported into the United States and each unit of hazardous waste generated. The remaining 220 million dollars comes from appropriations of general
revenue. Comprehensive Environmental Responses Act, supra note 304, at Title
II.
306. Id. at § 101 (14). As originally introduced, the Comprehensive Environmental Responses Act included a very comprehensive definition of hazardous substances. The original bill would have held companies liable for damage caused by
any emission or release not governed by existing clean air and clean water laws.
Industry was strongly opposed to this provision as it superceded existing pollution
laws, thereby greatly increasing industry's potential liability. Environmental
Emergency Response Act: Hearings and Markup on S. 1480 Before the Senate
Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 713-51 (1979). An
amendment to the bill was adopted which dramatically limited the types of hazardous substance releases covered by the measure. The amendment exempted
certain releases allowed under five existing environmental laws: Clean Water Act,
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Regional Pollution Plans
Various regional programs aimed at controlling ocean pollution
have been enacted. The Baltic Marine Environment Protection
Commission was established307 and met in Helsind on May 8,
1980 to attempt to draft a comprehensive program to clean up the
Baltic Sea.308 The commission agreed upon increased regulation
of ships carrying oil or chemicals into the Baltic Sea. 309 Also, the
Soviet Union agreed to stop its practice of dumping untreated
sewage into the Baltic by 1985.310
The Mediterranean countries agreed on a plan to clean up the
Mediterranean Sea.3 11 This agreement covers a wide range of pollutants and is expected to cost the signatories 10 to 15 billion dol312
lars over the next 10 to 15 years.
Meeting of the International Whaling Commission
The International Whaling Commission (IWC)3'3 held its annual conference on July 21, 1980 in Brighton, England.3 14 At the
Clean Air Act, Safe Drinking Water Act, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act,
and Ocean Dumping Act. S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1980).
Certain members of Congress were strongly opposed to passage of the Comprehension Environmental Responses Act due to its omission of oil spill coverage.
Nevertheless, the measure was approved after proponents promised to pursue a
bill governing oil spills next year. 38(49) CONG. Q. 3509 (1980).
307. This commission was established pursuant to the Baltic Protection Convention, done March 22, 1974, reprinted in 13 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 544 (1974).
The members of this commission are Denmark, Finland, East Germany, West Germany, Poland, the Soviet Union, and Sweden. Id.
308. London Times, May 9, 1980, at 10, col a.
309. The commission issued a recommendation that every tanker of more than
24,000 tons and every chemical carrier of more than 1,600 tons report its entry into
the Baltic and also report its position at regular intervals to a chain of ground stations. Id.
310. Currently, Leningrad and Copenhagen dump all of their sewage into the
Baltic untreated. Id.
311. N.Y. Times, May 14, 1980, at 12, col. 1. A total of 17 countries were present
at this meeting. The only Mediterranean country that did not participate was Albania. Id.
312. Christian Sci. Monitor, July 18, 1980, at 12, col 1. Pollution of the Mediterranean Sea presents a particularly difficult problem for countries attempting to
clean up the sea because the narrow passage out of the sea at Gilbralter prevents
pollutants from readily escaping. Id.
313. The International Whaling Commission was established by the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat. 1716, T.LA.S.
1849, 161 U.N.T.S. 72.
314. L.A. Times, July 22, 1980, § 1, at 2, col 1. The countries present at the meeting were Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Britain, Canada, Chile, Denmark, France,

meeting, the United States attempted to obtain a world-wide ban
on the commercial killing of whales. 315 The proposal failed to obtain the required three-fourths majority.3 1 6 The IWC did agree,
however, on a 9.2 percent reduction in the world-wide whale kill
quota. 317 The Commission also agreed to reduce slightly the
quota of bowhead whales permitted to be killed by Alaskan Eskimos. 318 An issue not dealt with by the Commission concerned
protection for smaller seagoing mammals such as porpoises. 31 9
Porpoises are now protected under United States law, and the
United States has urged the Commission to adopt similar protective measures.3 20 Although it did not adopt protective measures
for the porpoises, the Commission did ask its scientific committee
to prepare a report for the 1981 meeting on the possibility of pro32 1
tecting such mammals.
SUMMARY

Renewed optimism marked the close of the Ninth Session of
UNCLOS Ill. Delegates from over 150 nations were able to agree
on the text of a Draft Convention resolving most of the oustanding issues. Particularly significant was the achievement of consensus on a voting procedure for the Sea-Bed Council.
At the opening of the Tenth Session, delegates were less certain
about an expedited conclusion of the convention. This was due
largely to a decision by the new United States administration to
Iceland, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Oman, Peru, the
Seychelles, South Africa, South Korea, U.S.S.R., Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and
the United States. L.A. Times, July 23, 1980, § 1, at 1, col 1.
315. L.A. Times, July 23, 1980, § 1, at 1, col. 1.
316. Japan led the fight against this proposal. Wash. Post, July 22, 1980, § A, at
11, col 1. Japan is the world's largest consumer of whale meat. Its whaling industry is also the largest in the world, employing an estimated 50,000 persons. Id.
The Japanese contend that the quotas set by the IWC are based on inaccurate
data. They contend that the IWC is underestimating the available whale stocks
and therefore the established quota is overly restrictive. LA Times, Nov. 23, 1979,
§ 8, at 1, coL 1.
317. LA Times, July 27, 1980, § 1, at 5, coL 1. Five years ago, the quota was
25,000 whales, two years ago it was 20,102 whales, last year's quota was 15,656
whales, and this year the Commission set the quota at 14,553. Id.
318. The new quota is 45 whales landed or 65 whales struck (harpooned) in the
next three years with a maximum of 17 whales landed in any one year. Id. Members of the Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission disagree with the findings of the
IWC. They contend that 48 whales are a safe and desirable number to harvest
each year. Bockstone, Battle of the Bowheads, 5 NATURAL HisTORy 53, 60 (1980).
319. Once a year, Japanese fishermen on Uld Island round up and kill porpoises
in an attempt to thin their population. American environmentalists have attempted to stop this practice. L.A. Times, Mar. 3, 1980, § 1, at 4, coL 4.
320. The Commerce department has adopted regulations limiting the number
of porpoises which may be killed as tuna are netted. The 1981 limit is 20,500
porpoises. L.A. Times, Oct. 22, 1980, § 1, at 3, coL 5.
321. L.A Times, July 27, 1980, § 1, at 5, coL 1.
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undertake a substantive review of the entire treaty package. 322
Although the convention may still be completed in 1981, its viability could be jeopardized should the United States choose not to
participate.
Many significant developments occurred in the law of the sea
outside the conference. The Antarctic Treaty on Marine Living
Resources was concluded. Unilateral legislation authorizing companies to mine the deep seabed was passed in the United States,
as was legislation aimed at curbing ocean pollution. In addition,
regional pollution plans were established in the Baltic and the
Mediterranean. Many issues remain unresolved however. The
most noteworthy of these concern the lack of agreement between
the United States and its neighbors, Canada and Mexico, over
fishing rights in adjacent waters.
JEFFREY LEE GERTLER
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322. L.A. Times, Mar. 6, 1981, § 1, at 1, coL 3.
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